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THE SUPREME COURT BAR AT THE BAR OF PATENTS 
Paul R. Gugliuzza* 
Over the past two decades, a few dozen lawyers have come to dominate practice 
before the U.S. Supreme Court.  By many accounts, these elite lawyers—whose 
clients are often among the largest corporations in the world—have spurred the 
Court to hear more cases that businesses care about and to decide those cases in 
favor of their clients.  The Supreme Court’s recent case law on antitrust, 
arbitration, punitive damages, class actions, and more provides copious examples.  
Though it is often overlooked in discussions of the emergent Supreme Court 
bar, patent law is another area in which the Court’s agenda has changed 
significantly in the past twenty years.  After rarely hearing patent cases for several 
decades, the Court now decides three or more patent cases nearly every Term.  This 
article presents an empirical analysis linking the Supreme Court’s increasing 
interest in patent law to the elite bar’s growing involvement in patent litigation.  
Though correlation does not prove causation, the article relies on a novel dataset 
of cert. petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases to suggest that the elite bar has, in 
fact, contributed to the growth of the Supreme Court’s patent docket.  Among the 
article’s key findings is that, in patent cases, a cert. petition filed by an elite lawyer 
is three times more likely to be granted than a petition filed by a lawyer outside that 
group.  And although elite lawyers account for only 16% of cert. petitions filed in 
patent cases, their petitions account for a remarkable 40% of the petitions granted.  
Because patent appeals are centralized in the Federal Circuit, patent law lacks 
the circuit splits that the law clerks who sift through cert. petitions would normally 
look for in recommending that the Court grant review.  But the presence of elite 
lawyers may not be an ideal proxy for cert.-worthiness.  In fact, the increasing 
participation of those lawyers in patent litigation could help explain why the 
Court’s recent patent cases, though substantial in number, mainly involve issues of 
jurisdiction, procedure, and statutory interpretation—not the core areas of patent 
law where the Court’s input would be most useful. 
                                               
*  Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law.  For comments and helpful 
discussions, thanks to Jonas Anderson, Bob Bone, Stacey Dogan, John Duffy, John Golden, Tim 
Holbrook, Mark Lemley, Mike Meurer, Lisa Ouellette, Rachel Rebouché, and Greg Reilly, as well 
as participants at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting in Toronto, the Junior IP 
Scholars Association Summer Workshop at Northwestern University School of Law, the IP Scholars 
Conference at UC Berkeley School of Law, and the IP, Science, and Technology Workshop at the 
University of Texas School of Law.  Thanks also to Ally Faustin, Kris Hansen, Hillary Leffue, and 
Allison McSorley for superb research assistance.  Finally, special thanks to David Schwartz and 
Kathy Zeiler for guidance on the quantitative aspects of this article.   
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court decided a case with the inimitable caption 
of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.1  As the Court explained, 
its opinion “address[ed] once again the relation between two patent law concepts, 
the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel”—concepts 
the Court had tackled only five Terms earlier in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chemical Co.2  Later in 2002, in an article titled The Festo Decision and the 
Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, John Duffy contended that, 
although the Supreme Court had decided very few patent cases during the second 
half of the twentieth century, decisions such as Festo and Warner-Jenkinson 
reflected a Court that was “increasingly comfortable in reviewing patent decisions 
and increasingly interested in directing the development of law in the field.”3 
Since Duffy wrote that article, the Supreme Court’s engagement with patent 
law has grown tremendously.  After deciding less than one patent case per Term 
                                               
1 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
2 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
3 John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 283.  I am indebted to Duffy and his article for inspiring the title of this 
piece.   
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from 1982 (the year the Federal Circuit assumed exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
appeals4) through 2004, the Court has decided 40 patent cases since 2005—an 
average of over three per Term.5   
Scholars have proposed several explanations for the modern Supreme Court’s 
close attention to patent law, and most of them likely contain a grain of truth.  One 
common sentiment is that the Federal Circuit, the semi-specialized court created to 
achieve uniformity in patent law, has failed, undone by the tunnel vision and 
interest group capture thought to be endemic to specialized tribunals.6  In a similar 
vein, the Supreme Court’s recent patent decisions read like a campaign to eliminate 
what is often referred to as “patent exceptionalism”7—rulings (usually by the 
Federal Circuit) that exempt patent law from transsubstantive principles of 
jurisdiction, procedure, remedies, and extraterritoriality that govern in other areas 
of federal litigation.8  More benignly, the Supreme Court, in deciding an increasing 
number of patent cases, might be playing the role of “percolator” of patent 
doctrine—a necessary function in a field where, because of the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive jurisdiction, inter-circuit dialogue about the content of the law does not 
exist.9  More simply, the Court’s large docket of patent cases could reflect the 
                                               
4 See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 
1453-64 (2012) (summarizing the Federal Circuit’s history and jurisdiction). 
5 For a frequently updated list of Supreme Court patent decisions, see Supreme Court Patent 
Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html; see 
also infra fig. 1. 
6 For discussions of the problems commonly associated with specialized courts and analyses of 
whether those problems exist in the Federal Circuit, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal 
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989); Craig Allen Nard & 
John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1628-29 
(2007); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System 
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1110 (2003).  For a more general analysis of courts—both 
specialized and not—as potential targets of interest group capture, see J. Jonas Anderson, Court 
Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1574 (2018). 
7 See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416 
(2016). 
8 See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute, 66 
AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1028-29 (2017) (providing case examples); see also J. Jonas Anderson, 
Reining in a “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1569, 1603 (2018) (“[A]n overlooked aspect of the Supreme Court’s recent patent 
jurisprudence is how little guidance the Court has provided on patent law doctrine.  The Court 
appears to be more interested in the procedural aspects of patent litigation than the substance of 
patent doctrine.”).  For a more general analysis of inter-field consistency as a motivator for granting 
certiorari, see Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 1345, 1348 (2018) (suggesting that, in deciding whether to grant certiorari, “the Supreme Court 
appears to consider . . . whether two fields of law apply the same transsubstantive doctrine 
differently”). 
9 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate 
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 662 (2009). 
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notion that, in a digitized and networked world, intellectual property rights are of 
greater social and economic importance than they were a few decades ago.10  
Indeed, the amount of patent litigation in the federal courts has increased in the past 
twenty years and, though the magnitude of that increase is a matter of dispute,11 
more patent litigation offers the Supreme Court more patent cases to choose from 
and raises more issues of patent law to be resolved.  Not only are the lower courts 
creating more patent law, Congress is, too.  The America Invents Act (AIA), passed 
in 2011,12 has provided the impetus for several recent Supreme Court decisions in 
patent cases,13 and disputes involving the AIA will likely populate the Court’s 
docket for the foreseeable future.14  
In this article, I seek to introduce an additional consideration into the on-going 
endeavor to understand the Supreme Court’s newfound interest in patent law:  the 
changing characteristics of the lawyers litigating patent cases on appeal.  The past 
few decades have seen the emergence of a small, elite group of lawyers specializing 
not in any substantive area of law but in litigation at the Supreme Court.15  The 
academic literature on this new Supreme Court bar suggests that the Court is highly 
sympathetic to the arguments pressed by those elite lawyers, who often represent 
the world’s largest corporations in matters of significant interest to the business 
community. 16   This article extends those insights to the field of patent law, 
presenting the results of a novel empirical study showing that the elite Supreme 
Court bar has, indeed, arrived at the bar of patents.   
                                               
10 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP 
THEORY 62, 77 (2013). 
11 See Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994-2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1065, 
1078-85 (2016). 
12 America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
13 See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 628 (2019); Oil States 
Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); see also Sandoz 
Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017) (involving the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act, passed in 2010 as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
14 See, e.g., Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 397 (2018) (granting cert. on the 
question of whether the federal government is a “person” who may challenge patent validity in the 
new administrative proceedings created by the AIA). 
15  See Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014), 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus. 
16  See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490-91 (2008); see also 
Katherine Shaw, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus Invitations, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1541 (2016) (noting that “the expertise and talents” of elite Supreme Court 
lawyers “are disproportionately deployed in the service of business interests” and discussing the 
“troubling distributional consequences” of that dynamic). 
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As recently as a decade ago, elite Supreme Court advocates—which I generally 
define as lawyers who have presented oral argument in five or more Supreme Court 
cases in the preceding ten years17—filed barely 10% of cert. petitions in patent 
cases arising out of the Federal Circuit.  Since 2010, however, that percentage has 
more than doubled:  over the past seven Terms, a small group of lawyers—no more 
than 30 strong and headed by well-known generalist appellate litigators such as 
Carter Phillips, Paul Clement, Seth Waxman, and Tom Goldstein—have served as 
counsel of record on nearly a quarter of cert. petitions filed in Federal Circuit patent 
cases.   
This correlation between the increased presence of elite advocates in Supreme 
Court patent litigation and the Court’s growing docket of patent cases of course 
does not prove causation.  The data I have gathered, however, suggests that elite 
lawyers have helped shape the Court’s agenda at the behest of their often well-
heeled clients.  Specifically, I find that, in patent cases, a cert. petition filed by an 
elite advocate is three times more likely to be granted than a petition filed by a 
lawyer outside that group.  Moreover, although elite lawyers accounted for only 
16% of cert. petitions filed in patent cases from 2002 though 2016, they accounted 
for 40% of the petitions granted review.  Both of these findings are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  In short, though many different factors have surely 
influenced the Supreme Court to take a greater interest in patent law, the presence 
of elite advocates seeking certiorari deserves, at minimum, a spot on the list. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the datasets 
I built for this project, including a novel collection of every cert. petition filed in a 
Federal Circuit patent case from 2002 through 2016.  Drawing on those datasets, 
Part II provides original empirical evidence illustrating that, over the past few 
decades, the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law has increased not only in terms 
of the raw number of cases decided but, more importantly, in a relative sense:  cert. 
petitions in patent cases, my data indicates, are two-to-three times more likely to be 
granted today than they were a decade ago.  And cert. petitions in patent cases are 
now nearly twice as likely to be granted as the average petition, unlike in the recent 
past, when cert. petitions in patent cases were less likely to be granted than the 
average petition.  Part III then presents evidence linking the elite Supreme Court 
bar’s involvement in patent litigation to the Court’s growing docket of patent cases.  
It also shows how cases involving elite lawyers are more likely to have other 
characteristics widely acknowledged to make a cert. grant more likely, such as an 
order from the Court calling for the views of the Solicitor General, a large number 
of cert.-stage amicus briefs, or both.  Part IV concludes the article by discussing 
some limitations of the data that is currently available and sketching a roadmap for 
                                               
17 For a more detailed discussion of my definition of the Supreme Court elite, see infra Part I. 
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future research to better understand how the elite bar shapes both the Supreme 
Court’s agenda in patent cases and the substance of patent law.   
I. DATASETS, DEFINITIONS, AND METHODOLOGY 
This part describes the four novel datasets I built to prepare this article.  It begins 
by summarizing the data I used to identify the lawyers who qualify as members of 
the elite Supreme Court bar and by explaining the definition of “elite” that I chose 
to employ.  It then describes a unique dataset I constructed containing all cert. 
petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases over the past fifteen years, as well as two 
datasets of amicus briefs and calls for the view of the Solicitor General, both of 
which provide useful points of comparison for the patent-specific data I have 
gathered. 
A. The Elite Supreme Court Bar:  Data and Definition 
The first of the four datasets I built for this project contains, among other 
information, the identity and organizational affiliation (law firm, government 
entity, etc.) of every lawyer who conducted oral argument in every case (not just 
patent cases) heard by the Supreme Court from October Terms (OTs) 1992 through 
2016.18  This dataset allowed me to determine which lawyers, exactly, comprise the 
elite Supreme Court bar.  For the purpose of this article, I considered a lawyer to 
be a member of that group if the lawyer had presented oral argument in at least five 
cases in the Term under review and the preceding ten Terms, combined.19   
I adopted this definition of elite (to the exclusion over other possible metrics, 
such as number of cert. petitions filed or affiliation with a law firm that has a 
significant Supreme Court practice) because I view the repeated, individual 
presentation of oral argument before the Justices to be the best indicator that a 
lawyer is a member of the elite.  Those individual presentations allow the Justices 
to become familiar with the lawyer and his or her work.  Even more importantly, 
the individual delivery of oral argument creates the news coverage and notoriety 
that allows lawyers to be known, by name, to the Justices’ law clerks.   
                                               
18 I obtained the identity of the lawyers conducting oral argument from the Supreme Court’s 
journal, which contains the official minutes of the Court from each day the Court is in session.  See 
Supreme Court of the United States, Journal, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal.aspx.  
In most circumstances, I obtained information about each lawyer’s organizational affiliation from 
the briefs in the case, which were usually available on Westlaw or ProQuest Supreme Court Insight.  
See infra note 45.  I occasionally obtained affiliation information from other sources, such as the 
transcript of oral argument, which often lists organizational affiliation for government lawyers. 
19 So, for example, a lawyer filing a cert. petition in a patent case in the 2016 Term met my 
definition of elite if he or she had presented argument in at least five cases from the 2006 Term 
through the 2016 Term, inclusive. 
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Indeed, in assessing the factors that influence the Court to grant or deny 
certiorari, it is difficult to overstate the importance of law clerks.20  The Court 
receives over six thousand cert. petitions every year,21 and it is the law clerks—not 
the Justices—who sift through those petitions and identify the small number that 
are plausibly worthy of review.22  (In a given Term, the Court grants between 
seventy and eighty petitions. 23 )  To lighten the law clerks’ workload, most 
chambers participate in the “cert. pool”—an arrangement under which one law 
clerk prepares a memo analyzing the petition’s cert.-worthiness for all of the 
Justices participating the pool (currently seven).24  Petitions identified as possibly 
worth granting are put on a list for further discussion and vote at the Justices’ 
weekly conference.25   
Importantly, when a law clerk’s memo recommends that a petition be denied, 
that is typically the end of the road—odds are no Justice will ever even see that 
petition.26  As H.W. Perry put it in his definitive study of the cert. process:  “Clerks 
are probably more influential in cert. than in opinion writing because often the 
justice defers to their analysis of the issues in a cert. petition . . . . [M]ost justices 
never read more than the clerk’s memo if the recommendation is to deny.”27  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, in his historical monograph about the Court, confirmed the 
great—if not dispositive—weight given to the clerk’s recommendation on cert., 
writing:   “As soon as I am confident that my new law clerks are reliable, I take 
their word and that of the pool memo writer . . . and with a large majority of the 
petitions it is not necessary to go any further than the pool memo.”28   
Thus, at the cert.-stage, the Justices’ law clerks play a crucially important 
screening function.  How do the clerks wield their power?  From a clerk’s 
                                               
20 See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 69 (1991) (“[O]ne cannot talk about the agenda-
setting process without talking about the law clerks.”). 
21 See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, JOURNAL FOR OCTOBER TERM 2017 at ii, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/Jnl17.pdf (reporting 6315 new cases docketed during 
the 2017 Term).  
22 For a summary of the law clerks’ responsibilities in processing cert. petitions, see STEPHEN 
M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 40-42, 318-21 (10th ed. 2013). 
23 See, e.g., SUPREME COURT, supra note 21, at ii (reporting 77 granted petitions in the 2017 
Term). 
24 Tony Mauro, Unlike Gorsuch, Kavanaugh Jumps Into SCOTUS Cert Pool, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 
11, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/10/11/unlike-gorsuch-kavanaugh-jumps-
into-scotus-cert-pool.  Justices Alito and Gorsuch do not participate. 
25 Any chambers can request that a case be added to the so-called discuss list.  PERRY, supra 
note 20, at 43. 
26 See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 22, at 321 (“[C]ases that do not appear on the [discuss] list 
by the day before the conference are automatically denied . . . .”).  
27 PERRY, supra note 20, at 70. 
28 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 233-34 (2001). 
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perspective, it is risky to recommend that the Court grant review.  Grant 
recommendations are subjected to rigorous scrutiny, both for whether review 
should, in fact, be granted, as well as for procedural infirmities that might prove the 
law clerk’s recommendation to have been mistaken. 29   By contrast, denial 
recommendations are rarely second guessed, as the discussion above suggests.  
Thus, law clerks, by most accounts, will search for “objectively identifiable 
grounds” to justify a grant recommendation—most commonly, a split of authority 
among the courts below.30   
Circuit splits, however, rarely happen in patent cases because of the 
centralization of appeals in the Federal Circuit.31  In the absence of circuit splits, 
another “objective” factor that might drive law clerk decisionmaking at the cert. 
stage—and which this article focuses on—is the identity (and accompanying 
expertise) of the petitioner’s counsel of record, as indicated on the cover of the cert. 
petition.32  The rich, emerging literature on the new Supreme Court bar suggests 
that lawyer identity matters at the cert. stage in all types of cases.33  In patent cases, 
lawyer identity may play an outsized role because of the lack of other objective 
indicators of cert.-worthiness, such as a circuit split.34  
In developing the definition of “elite” Supreme Court lawyer for this article, the 
significant influence of law clerks at the cert. stage is what led me to require a 
lawyer’s appearances before the Supreme Court to be within the past decade.  Law 
clerks, relatively fresh out of law school, may not as readily recognize the name of 
a lawyer who argued, say, ten Supreme Court cases two decades ago as they will 
                                               
29 See PERRY, supra note 20, at 63; see also Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its 
Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1376-77 (2006) 
(“The prevailing ethos is that no harm can flow from ‘just saying no.’  Self-confident law clerks can 
rest assured that few, if any, recriminations will attend their providing guidance to the Court to deny 
certiorari.  Harm can, and indeed does, flow when a hapless clerk recommends a grant of certiorari, 
and the merits are eventually seen as not all they were cracked up to be.” (footnotes omitted)). 
30 See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the 
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 980 (2007); see also SUP. CT. R. 10(a)-(b) (listing 
conflicting decisions between the federal courts of appeals, state courts, or both, as “considerations 
governing review on certiorari”). 
31 See Narechania, supra note 8, at 1347. 
32 SUP. CT. R. 34(1)(f) (requiring the name of petitioner’s counsel to appear on the petition’s 
cover). 
33 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1526 (“When [the law clerks] see the name of an attorney 
whose work before the Court they know, at least by reputation, that attorney’s involvement in the 
case, by itself, conveys an important message about the significance of the legal issues being 
presented and the credibility of the assertions being made.”). 
34 Cf. Narechania, supra note 8, at 1348 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s cert. decisions in 
patent cases are influenced by the existence of “field splits”—situations in which “two fields of law 
apply the same transsubstantive doctrine differently”). 
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the name of a lawyer who has argued at least one case every other Term in the past 
decade.  
This definition, no doubt, ultimately classifies as non-elite some petitions filed 
by lawyers with whom the Justices and their law clerks are surely familiar, either 
through prior arguments or the advocates’ own Supreme Court clerkships.35  But 
other recent studies documenting the emergence of a specialized Supreme Court 
bar have similarly used five arguments as the line that must necessarily be drawn 
to provide a definition of the elite.  For instance, in their exhaustive story on the 
existence and impact of the expert Supreme Court bar, journalist Joan Biskupic and 
her co-authors defined as a “top oral advocate” anyone who argued at least five 
cases during the past decade.36  Richard Lazarus, in his pathmarking law review 
article on the emergence of the modern Supreme Court bar, adopted a slightly more 
capacious definition, identifying a lawyer as an expert in Supreme Court advocacy 
if the lawyer had presented at least five oral arguments in his or her career or was 
affiliated with a firm whose attorneys had collectively argued at least ten cases.37   
Though my definition of elite is relatively narrow, it should be noted that a 
broader definition (for example, requiring only one prior argument or considering 
firm affiliation) would likely only strengthen my results showing elite lawyers’ 
increasing domination of Supreme Court patent litigation.  In recent years, the 
Court has granted several patent petitions filed by lawyers from firms with 
significant Supreme Court practices and who have previously argued before the 
Court—just not quite frequently enough to qualify as elite, as I have defined that 
term.38  In Part III of the article, I present some background data on the number of 
lawyers who met my definition of elite.  
B. Cert. Petitions in Patent Cases, Amicus Briefs, and CVSGs 
The second dataset I created for this article contains every cert. petition filed in 
a patent case arising out of the Federal Circuit that the Supreme Court either granted 
or denied from the 2002 Term through the 2016 Term.39  To create that dataset, I 
                                               
35 See Shaw, supra note 16, at 1556-57 (discussing the importance of a prior Supreme Court 
clerkship in obtaining an appointment from the Court to argue as an amicus). 
36 Biskupic et al., supra note 15. 
37 Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1502. 
38 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy 
Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018), 2016 WL 6995217 (Allyson Ho, then of Morgan Lewis, who at 
the time had argued three cases before the Court); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, SAS Institute, 
Inc. v. Lee, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), 2017 WL 491052 (Greg Castanias of Jones Day, who at the 
time had argued four cases before the Court); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, TC Heartland, LLC 
v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017), 2016 WL 4983136 (James Dabney of 
Hughes Hubbard, who at the time had argued three cases before the Court).   
39 The dataset does not include petitions that were voluntarily dismissed by the parties (due to 
settlement, for instance, see, e.g., Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater 
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used the Supreme Court’s journal40 to compile a list of every cert. petition arising 
from a Federal Circuit case during those Terms.  I included only petitions for which 
the petitioner paid the $300 filing fee;41 I excluded petitions filed in forma pauperis 
because those petitions are rarely granted42—and certainly not in any patent case 
since 1982.43  The next step was to winnow that list of paid cert. petitions to patent 
cases only.  Many cases could be easily identified as having nothing to do with 
patents by reviewing the Federal Circuit’s decision or, in some circumstances, by 
merely reading the caption.44  For every other case, I personally reviewed the cert. 
petition to determine whether the underlying case was, in fact, a patent case.  The 
full text of most petitions was available on Westlaw; for the petitions that were not 
on Westlaw I used ProQuest Supreme Court Insight.45 
The vast majority of petitions could easily be classified as patent or non-patent 
based on the question presented, but a small number of petitions, perhaps one or 
two per Term, presented close calls.  Ultimately, I coded a petition as a patent 
petition if it presented (1) a substantive question of patent law (such as a question 
                                               
Drilling, Inc., 572 U.S. 1131 (2014)).  See generally SUP. CT. R. 46.1 (“At any stage of the 
proceedings, whenever all parties file with the Clerk an agreement in writing that a case be 
dismissed, . . . the Clerk, without further reference to the Court, will enter an order of dismissal.”). 
40 See supra note 18. 
41 See SUP. CT. R. 38(a). 
42 SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 22, at 557-58. 
43 Separating paid petitions from in forma pauperis petitions is made easier by the Court’s 
docket numbering system, which assigns paid petitions docket numbers between YY-1 and YY-
4999 (where YY is the last two digits of the Term in which the petition was filed) and in forma 
pauperis petitions docket numbers of YY-5000 and above.  See Kevin Russell, Mystery of the 
Premature Docket Number, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 28, 2009), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/09/mystery-of-the-premature-docket-number (explaining also 
that the Court begins to assign docket numbers for the subsequent Term in June, after the Court has 
handed down the current Term’s final opinions but before the subsequent Term technically begins 
on the first Monday of October, see 28 U.S.C. § 2).  If you are still reading this footnote, kudos to 
you for your enthusiasm about the minutiae of Supreme Court administration!   
44 For instance, cases in which the respondent was the Merit Systems Protection Board or the 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs could readily be coded as non-patent cases.  Non-patent cases account 
for 47.2% (551 of 1168) of the paid cert. petitions seeking review of Federal Circuit decisions from 
2002 through 2016.  The proportion of non-patent cert. petitions gradually declined during the 
period covered by my study.  In nearly every Term from 2002 through 2011, non-patent petitions 
accounted for over half of all paid petitions.  From 2012 through 2016, however, the average 
proportion of non-patent petitions declined to 37.2%.  Similar changes have occurred at the Federal 
Circuit, where the court’s docket is increasingly populated by patent cases, due largely to the 
growing number of appeals from the new post-issuance proceedings created by the America Invents 
Act.  See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeals Filed in Major Origins, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/Hist_Caseld_by_ 
Major_Origin_10-year.pdf.  For additional data on the proportion of cert. petitions in patent and 
non-patent cases, see infra app’x A.  
45 See Supreme Court Insight (1975-present), PROQUEST, https://www.proquest.com/products-
services/Supreme-Court-Insight.html. 
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about patentability, infringement,46 or claim construction), (2) a question about the 
interpretation or application of the Patent Act (such as a question about attorneys’ 
fees or enhanced damages),47 (3) a question of procedural law, jurisdictional law, 
or remedies in a case involving a live claim arising under patent law,48 or (4) a 
question of non-patent law in a case in which the existence of a patent provided the 
basis for the dispute, such as an antitrust claim based on patent-related conduct49 or 
a contract claim involving a patent license.50  By contrast, I coded a petition as a 
non-patent petition if it presented (1) only substantive issues of non-patent law51 or 
(2) a question of procedural law in a case in which the patent claims were entirely 
out of the dispute by the time it reached the cert. stage.52  It bears emphasizing that 
the number of close cases was extremely small—no more than 15 or 20 in the entire 
dataset—so slightly different coding practices would not significantly affect the 
overall results.    
My dataset of paid cert. petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases, which covers 
fifteen terms (2002 through 2016), contains 589 petitions, excluding petitions that 
                                               
46 Including exhaustion of patent rights.  E.g., Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017). 
47 E.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (considering the 
standard for awarding enhanced damages under § 284 of the Patent Act); Octane Fitness, LLC v. 
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 548 (2014) (considering the standard for granting 
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party under § 285 of the Patent Act). 
48  Examples of patent cases raising procedural, jurisdictional, or remedial issues include 
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 396 (2006) (holding, in a patent 
infringement dispute, that a party’s failure to move for a new trial or for judgment as a matter of law 
after a jury verdict forecloses that party from seeking a new trial on appeal based on insufficiency 
of the evidence), Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., No. 08-43, 
2008 WL 2704334 (U.S. filed July 3, 2008) (raising a question about notice of appeal deadlines in 
a patent infringement dispute), and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) 
(considering the standard for granting injunctive relief after a finding of patent infringement). 
49 E.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 
No. 08-1194, 2009 WL 797579 (U.S. filed Mar. 23, 2009) (antitrust challenge to “reverse payment” 
settlements of pharmaceutical patent litigation). 
50 Though it did not originate in the Federal Circuit and hence is not included in my dataset, a 
good example would be Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015) (holding 
unenforceable contracts charging royalties after a patent expires). 
51 A paradigmatic example is Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015), which was appealed to the Federal Circuit because the original 
complaint included patent infringement claims.  Those patent claims were entirely out of the case 
by the time Google filed its cert. petition.  See id. at 1347. 
52 Examples include:  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Wayne-Dalton Corp. v. Amarr Co., No. 
09-260, 2009 WL 2864356 (U.S. filed Aug. 31, 2009) (question about the Federal Circuit’s use of 
no-opinion affirmances in a case where the live claim was for false advertising under the Lanham 
Act), and Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Designing Health, Inc. v. Erasmus, No. 07-34, 2007 WL 
1974208 (U.S. filed July 2, 2007) (raising issues about post-trial motions and the Seventh 
Amendment in a case where the live claims were for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty). 
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the Supreme Court granted, vacated, and remanded (GVR’d).  The most common 
reason for a GVR is that the Court has issued a plenary ruling that is potentially 
relevant to the question presented.53  Less commonly, the Court will GVR if the 
case becomes moot (usually due to settlement) while the cert. petition is pending.54  
Because a GVR usually indicates little about the petition’s merits I exclude GVR’d 
petitions from the analysis below unless otherwise indicated.55    
I then coded each patent petition for, among other things:  the petitioner’s 
counsel of record (as it appeared on the cover of the petition), the counsel of 
record’s organizational affiliation, whether the respondent waived the right to 
respond (and, if it did, whether the Court subsequently requested a response), 
whether any amicus briefs were filed at the cert. stage (and, if they were, how 
many), whether the Court issued an order calling for the views of the Solicitor 
General (and, if it did, what the Solicitor General recommended), the Court’s 
disposition of the petition (granted, denied, or GVR’d), and, for petitions that were 
granted, whether the petitioner was a patentee, accused infringer, or neither (such 
as the Solicitor General seeking review on behalf of the Patent Office).  
In addition to my datasets of Supreme Court oral arguments and patent case 
cert. petitions, I created two other datasets to provide reference points for my 
patent-specific data.  First, I created a dataset of all cert. petitions (not just petitions 
in patent cases) on which the Court issued a call for the views of the Solicitor 
General (a “CVSG,” colloquially) from 2002 through 2016.  As I explain in more 
detail below, a CVSG often foreshadows the grant of cert.56  My objective in 
creating a dataset of CVSGs was to explore the extent to which the Court’s CVSG 
practice might differ in patent cases as compared to other types of cases.  
To create the dataset of CVSG cases, I used the Supreme Court’s journal to 
identify petitions on which the Court issued a CVSG.  I then personally reviewed 
the Solicitor General’s brief to determine its recommendation (grant, deny, GVR, 
or more a nuanced recommendation, such as to hold the petition pending a decision 
in another case).57  Most of the SG’s briefs were available on Westlaw; those that 
were not were available on the SG’s website.58  I then used Westlaw or the Supreme 
                                               
53 See, e.g., Medinol Ltd. v. Cordis Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1372, 1372 (2017) (GVR’ing in light of 
SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017), which 
held that laches cannot be asserted as a defense to a claim for damages for patent infringement). 
54 See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1876 (2014). 
55 Including GVR’d petitions, my dataset contains 617 petitions. 
56 See infra Part II.C. 
57 Occasionally, a case settles after the Court issues its CVSG but before the SG files its brief.  
See, e.g., Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 572 U.S. 
1131 (2014).  In that circumstance, there is simply no SG recommendation to include in the dataset. 
58  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. of the Solicitor Gen., Supreme Court Briefs, 
https://www.justice.gov/osg/supreme-court-briefs. 
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Court’s docket to determine the Court’s action on the petition and to code for 
whether the Court agreed or disagreed with the SG’s recommendation.  Finally, for 
each case in which the Court issued a CVSG, I used Westlaw or ProQuest Supreme 
Court Insight to determine the identity of the petitioner’s counsel of record as 
indicated on the cert. petition itself.   
As a second and final point of comparison, I created a dataset of amicus briefs 
filed at the cert. stage in all paid cases in three Supreme Court Terms:  2002, 2010, 
and 2016.  To create this dataset, I, with the help of research assistants, reviewed 
the docket for every case in which the Supreme Court either granted or denied 
certiorari in the 2002, 2010, and 2016 Terms.  We again used the Supreme Court’s 
journal to identify the relevant grants and denials, and we excluded petitions that 
were dismissed, GVR’d, or on which the Court issued a summary reversal.  We 
also excluded amicus briefs filed by the federal government in response to a CVSG.  
Because this process required reviewing the individual docket for over 1,500 cases 
per Term, we limited the dataset to the three Terms mentioned above.  I chose those 
Terms in particular because of their significance to the Court’s growing docket of 
patent cases.  As discussed below, 2002 pre-dates the dramatic growth of Supreme 
Court patent decisions, 2010 marks the beginning of the most substantial period of 
growth, and 2016 was the most recently concluded Term when I was collecting the 
data for this article.59 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S INCREASING INTEREST IN PATENT LAW  
Not long ago, the Supreme Court was, as Mark Janis put it, “well nigh invisible” 
in matters of patent law.60   For the first fifteen years of the Federal Circuit’s 
existence, 1982 through 1997, the Supreme Court decided, at most, one patent case 
per Term.  Though the Court decided three patent cases in both the 1998 and 2001 
Terms, the average number of patent cases decided per Term since the Federal 
Circuit’s creation remained below one until 2011—the eighth of a now fifteen-
consecutive-Term streak of the Supreme Court deciding at least one patent case.  In 
fact, in each of the past eight Terms (2010 through 2017), the Court has decided at 
least two patent cases, averaging 3.75 patent decisions per Term over that time 
period.  Figure 1 below graphically illustrates of the number of patent cases decided 
by the Supreme Court, per Term, from 1982 through 2017.61   
                                               
59 Supreme Court Terms begin and end on the first Monday of October.  28 U.S.C. § 2.  Thus, 
the 2016 Term ended in October 2017. 
60 Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
387, 387. 
61 Though Figure 1 indicates that the Supreme Court has decided a patent case in only fourteen 
consecutive Terms, the Court has already decided a patent case in the not-yet-concluded 2018 Term, 
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019), and another patent case 
is currently under submission after oral argument, Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 
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FIGURE 1.  PATENT CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT,  
OT1982 THROUGH OT201762 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the main objective of this article is to 
highlight an explanation for the growth of the Supreme Court’s patent docket that 
is rarely mentioned in the literature:  the increasing involvement of the elite, 
specialized Supreme Court bar in appellate patent litigation.  To set the stage for 
that analysis, this part of the article provides empirical evidence about how much, 
                                               
397 (2018).  Moreover, it seems likely that the streak will extend to sixteen Terms, with the Court 
having already granted certiorari in one patent case to be heard in the 2019 Term, Iancu v. 
NantKwest, Inc., No. 18-801, 2019 WL 1005844 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2019), and recently calling for the 
Solicitor General’s views in three additional patent cases, HP Inc. v. Berkheimer, No. 18-415, 2019 
WL 113064 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019), Tex. Advanced Optoelectronic Sols., Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am., 
Inc., No. 18-600, 2019 WL 113067 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019), and RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC, 139 S. 
Ct. 306 (2018). 
62 The primary source of the data reported in Figure 1 is Supreme Court Patent Cases, supra 
note 5.  Note that Figure 1 includes three patent-related Supreme Court cases that did not arise from 
the Federal Circuit:  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (Ninth Circuit), Gunn 
v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (Texas Supreme Court), and FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 
(2013) (Eleventh Circuit).  Because of the unusual origins of those cases, I exclude them from the 
remainder of this study unless otherwise indicated.  Figure 1 also includes two cases that raised a 
purely procedural issue in the context of a patent infringement dispute, Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. 
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006), and Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000), in 
accordance with this article’s definition of “patent case,” discussed above.  See supra Part I.B.  
Lastly, Figure 1 counts Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. and Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, 
Inc. as a single case because the cases were argued and decided in a consolidated fashion.  See Halo 
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016).  See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Is the Supreme Court Concerned with Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, or Both?, 16 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 313, 314 n.8 (2017) (describing the occasional difficulties in categorizing and 
counting Supreme Court patent cases). 
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exactly, the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law has grown, and it suggests that 
two factors strongly correlated with a cert. grant in all types of cases—the presence 
of amicus briefs at the cert. stage and the involvement of the Solicitor General—
may play an outsized role in patent cases.     
A. A Relative View of the Supreme Court’s Growing Patent Docket 
Observers—including elite Supreme Court advocates themselves—often cite 
the growing raw number of Supreme Court decisions in patent cases (as reflected 
on Figure 1 above) as evidence of the Court’s “increased interest” in patent law.63  
Yet that is ultimately a relative claim.  It could be that the Court is simply receiving 
a greater number of cert. petitions in patent cases and is granting them at the same 
rate it always has.  Or grant rates could be increasing in all types of cases, not just 
patent cases.  The data I have collected, however, indicates that patent law has, in 
fact, become a more important topic at the Supreme Court relative to other areas of 
law.  I make this claim based on two observations.  
First, cert. petitions in patent cases are more likely to be granted today than they 
were a decade ago.  Since 2002, the Supreme Court has granted 6.6% of paid cert. 
petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases (39 of 589).  Yet, from 2002 through 2009, 
the grant rate was only 3.9% (11 of 283).  From 2010 through 2016, however, the 
grant rate more than doubled to 9.2% (28 of 306), a change that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (p = .009).64  Figure 2 below indicates the number and 
percentage of patent petitions granted and denied on a Term-by-Term basis, 
showing that the grant rate has varied between a low of 0.0% (five times, but not 
since 2011) and a high of 18.8% (6 of 32) in 2010.   
                                               
63 E.g., Seth P. Waxman, May You Live in Interesting Times: Patent Law in the Supreme Court, 
17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 214, 216 (2017). 
64 Because the data presented throughout this article includes the entire population of relevant 
cases during the time periods of interest, the results are arguably statistically significant by 
definition.  Nevertheless, to provide a sense of the importance of observed differences, I report p-
values at several points, based on the assumption that my data is a sample of a larger population.  
Unless otherwise indicated, to calculate p-values, I used Microsoft Excel to perform a two-tail t-
test. 
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FIGURE 2.  PAID CERT. PETITIONS GRANTED OR DENIED IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
PATENT CASES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
A second indicator of the increased importance of patent cases at the Supreme 
Court is that cert. petitions in patent cases today are more likely to be granted than 
the average cert. petition whereas, not long ago, patent petitions were less likely 
than average to be granted.  To make an accurate comparison to the data the 
Supreme Court publishes about its overall grant rate, we must treat GVR’d petitions 
as being denied plenary review, which lowers the grant rate in Federal Circuit 
patent cases slightly, from 6.6% to 6.3% (39 of 617).  As Figure 3 below, illustrates, 
the Supreme Court’s overall grant rate in paid cases is 4.3%65—32% lower than the 
grant rate in patent cases and a difference that is statistically significant at the 5% 
level (p = .045).  In five of the seven most recent Terms (2010 through 2016), the 
grant rate in patent cases exceeded the overall grant rate, often substantially.  Over 
those seven Terms, the grant grate in Federal Circuit patent cases was 8.0% (28 of 
350, including GVR’d cases as denials).  The overall grant rate for that period, by 
contrast, was 4.4%.  That difference is also statistically significant (p = .015).  
Looking back to an earlier period, the grant rate in Federal Circuit patent cases from 
2002 through 2009, including GVR’d cases as denials, was only 4.0% (11 of 278).  
                                               
65 I obtained the Supreme Court’s overall grant rate from the statistics entry in the Harvard Law 
Review’s annual Supreme Court review.  See, e.g., The Supreme Court 2016 Term: The Statistics, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 410 tbl. II(B) (2017).  The grant rate reported by the Harvard Law Review, 
which is, in turn, based on statistics reported in the Supreme Court’s journals, see supra note 18, 
appears to treat GVR’d cases as, essentially, denials.  See id. at 410 n.f (including only cases granted 
plenary review as “grants” for the purpose of calculating the overall grant rate).      
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The overall grant rate for that period, by contrast, was 4.3%.  That small difference 
in grant rates during this earlier time period is not statistically significant (p = .793).    
FIGURE 3.  PAID CERT. PETITION GRANT RATES, FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES 
VERSUS ALL CASES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
To put it simply:  Today, cert. petitions in patent cases are more than twice as 
likely to be granted than they were a decade or two ago, and petitions in patent 
cases are roughly twice as likely to be granted as the average cert. petition.   
Having established that cert. petitions in patent cases are increasingly likely to 
be granted, the next question—and the question that occupies much of the rest of 
this article—is whether there is a way to tell which patent petitions are most likely 
to be granted.  To help answer that question, I have collected data on two factors 
identified in the literature as correlated with the Supreme Court’s decision to grant 
or deny certiorari in all types of cases:  the presence of amicus briefs at the cert. 
stage and the issuance of a call for the views of the Solicitor General.  Those factors, 
it turns out, may be even more salient in patent cases than in other areas of law.   
B. Amicus Briefs 
As Table 1 below illustrates, cert.-stage amicus briefs were filed alongside 
20.0% (118 of 589) of paid cert. petitions in patent cases from 2002 through 2016.66  
                                               
66 In counting amicus briefs for the purpose of this article, I have included both briefs filed in 
support of and in opposition to the petition because of the conventional wisdom that any cert.-stage 
amicus brief calls attention to the case and therefore makes a grant more likely.  See SHAPIRO, ET 
AL., supra note 22, at 515 (“[A] nonparty whose interest favors the denial of certiorari ordinarily 
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This level of amicus activity is noticeably higher than the comparable data for all 
paid cert. petitions filed in 2002, 2010, and 2016, which were accompanied by 
amicus briefs in, respectively, 8.5%, 11.6%, and 15.9% of cases.67   
TABLE 1.  CERT.-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS, FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES 
VERSUS OVERALL 
 
Indeed, in each of those individual Terms, the proportion of patent petitions 
supported by at least one amicus brief exceed the overall numbers:  In the 2002 
Term, 11.8% of patent petitions (4 of 34) were accompanied by at least one amicus 
brief, as compared to 8.5% of petitions overall.  In the 2010 Term, 29.0% of patent 
petitions (9 of 31) were accompanied by at least one amicus brief, as compared to 
11.6% overall.  And in 2016, 31.1% of patent petitions (19 of 61) were 
accompanied by at least one amicus brief, as compared to 15.9% overall.  Though 
these numbers indicate an upward trend in the number of cert.-stage amicus briefs 
filed in both patent cases and overall, the difference between the number of amicus 
briefs filed in patent cases as compared to the overall numbers is statistically 
significant for both the 2010 and 2016 Terms,68 meaning that, in general, recent 
patent cases have involved an unusually high level of amicus activity at the cert. 
stage.  As I explain in more detail below, this increase in amicus activity in patent 
cases neatly corresponds to the increased involvement of elite Supreme Court 
lawyers in patent disputes.69 
                                               
does not wish . . . to accentuate the importance of the case by filing a brief revealing that importance 
and concern; thus it is generally advisable . . . to forgo an amicus brief until after review is granted, 
if it is.”).  In any event—probably because of this conventional wisdom—the number of amicus 
briefs filed in opposition to review is vanishingly small.   
67 For other points of reference about the quantity of cert.-stage amicus briefs filed overall, see 
Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1530-31 (reporting that 9.5% of cert. petitions were supported by amicus 
briefs in the 2005 Term); Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 
1901, 1939 (2016) (reporting that 14.2% of cert. petitions were supported by amicus briefs in the 
2014 Term).  Those figures (and the increase from 2005 to 2014) are consistent with my data, though 
it should be noted that those prior studies included only briefs filed in support of the petition, not 
the small number filed against review.  See Larsen & Devins, supra, at 1939 n.217.   
68 For 2010, p = .045 and for 2016, p = .014.  For 2002, when the spread between patent cases 
and the overall numbers was smaller, p = .566. 







Petitions %	 % % %
With	amicus 118 20.0% 8.5% 11.6% 15.9%
Without	amicus 471 80.0% 91.5% 88.4% 84.1%
Fed.	Cir.	patent	cases	
OT2002-16
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Elite lawyers are well aware that eliciting support from sympathetic amici 
vastly increases the chance of review.70  One early study concluded that a petition 
supported by at least one amicus brief was three to four times more likely to be 
granted than a petition filed without amicus support.71  The more recent data I have 
collected, reported on Table 2 below, indicates that filing an amicus brief makes a 
grant eight to nine times more likely.72  The presence of a cert.-stage amicus brief 
in a patent case similarly makes the probability of grant about eight times more 
likely.73   
TABLE 2.  AMICUS BRIEFS AND CERT. GRANTS/DENIALS, FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
PATENT CASES VERSUS OVERALL 
 
There is, of course, an endogeneity concern with this data:  larger, more 
sophisticated litigants—who are more likely to attract the Court’s attention in the 
first place—are more likely to be able to obtain amicus support.  Yet two 
observations drawn from my data suggest that amicus briefs play a unique role in 
patent cases in particular.  First, as Table 2 above indicates, from 2002 through 
2016, two-thirds of the granted cert. petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases (26 of 
39) were accompanied by at least one amicus brief.74  By comparison, in 2002, only 
                                               
70 See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text. 
71 See PERRY, supra note 20, at 137-38. 
72 Specifically, for the 2002 Term, a paid petition accompanied by at least one amicus brief was 
8.6 times more likely to be granted (22.3% versus 2.6%); for the 2010 Term, 8.9 times more likely, 
(18.6% versus 2.1%); and for the 2016 Term, 8.3 times more likely (17.6% versus 2.2%).  For 
studies reporting similar figures, see Larsen & Devins, supra note 67, at 1939 (reporting that, in the 
2014 Term, a supporting amicus brief made a cert. grant six times more likely); Lazarus, supra note 
16, at 1528 (2005 Term, nearly 10 times more likely).  For more detailed data about of the number 
of cert.-stage amicus brief filings in the 2002, 2010, and 2016 Terms and corresponding grant rates, 
see infra app’x B-D.   
73 Specifically, 7.9 times more likely (22.0% versus 2.8%).  In a study covering 2000 through 
2009, Colleen Chien similarly reported that “the Supreme Court was seven times more likely to 
grant certiorari [in a patent case] . . . if a third party filed a brief urging the court to do so.”  Colleen 
V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 
1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 397, 424 (2011). 
74 One of the 13 granted cert. petitions without any accompanying amicus briefs was filed by 
the Solicitor General, who, many studies have noted, enjoys an enormous advantage in seeking 
certiorari on behalf of the federal government.  See PERRY, supra note 20, at 129.  Excluding that 
petition from the figures reported in the text, 68.4% of granted cert. petitions in patent cases (26 of 







Denied Granted %	Granted %	Granted %	Granted %	Granted
With	amicus 92 26 22.0% 22.3% 18.6% 17.6%
Without	amicus 458 13 2.8% 2.6% 2.1% 2.2%
Fed.	Cir.	patent	cases	OT2002-16
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44.6% of granted cert. petitions overall (33 of 74) were accompanied by at least 
one amicus brief.  In 2010, that figure was 53.3% (32 of 60).  Though the proportion 
of granted petitions accompanied by amicus briefs has steadily grown, reaching 
60.6% in 2016 (43 of 71), that figure is still smaller than the comparable figure for 
patent cases over the past fifteen Terms.75   Indeed, in more recent years, the 
proportion of granted patent petitions accompanied by amicus briefs has grown.  
From 2002 through 2009, seven of 11 granted cert. petitions in patent cases (63.6%) 
were accompanied by amicus briefs.  From 2010 through 2016, that figure 
increased to 19 of 28 (67.9%). 
Second, the quantity of amicus briefs filed appears to have a unique relationship 
to the likelihood of a cert. grant in patent cases as compared to Supreme Court cases 
more generally.  Across all types of cases (not just patent cases), the presence of 
even a single amicus brief at the cert. stage corresponds to a substantial increase in 
the likelihood of the Court granting review.  In 2002, for instance, a petition 
accompanied by just one amicus brief was over 3.5 times more likely to be granted 
than the average petition:  the grant rate was 15.1% for petitions accompanied by 
one amicus brief versus a grant rate of 4.2% overall.76  In 2010, the presence of a 
single amicus brief made a cert. grant over four times more likely:  17.2% for 
petitions accompanied by one amicus brief versus a grant rate of 4.1% overall.  And, 
in 2016, the presence of a single amicus brief made a cert. grant just over three 
times more likely:  13.9% for petitions accompanied by one amicus brief versus a 
grant rate of 4.6% overall.77   
The data for patent cases look much different.  As Table 3 below illustrates, a 
patent petition in which only one cert.-stage amicus brief is filed is actually less 
likely than the average patent petition to be granted:  the grant rate was 6.1% for 
patent petitions accompanied by one amicus brief as compared to the overall patent-
case grant rate of 6.6% reported above. 
                                               
75 The difference between the proportion of Federal Circuit patent cases with amicus briefs and 
the overall numbers for OT2002 is statistically significant (p = .024).  The smaller differences 
between the patent case numbers and the overall numbers for OT2010 and OT2016 are not 
statistically significant (p = .187 and p = .528, respectively).  But, recall, my data represents the 
entire population of relevant cases during the chosen time periods, meaning that any difference could 
arguably be considered significant.  See supra note 64. 
76 For more details about the number of amicus briefs filed in all cases in the 2002, 2010, and 
2016 Terms, see infra app’x B-D. 
77 All of the differences reported in this paragraph are statistically significant (p < .001).  
Studying the 2005 Term, Lazarus similarly found that the presence of a single amicus brief made a 
cert. grant nearly four times more likely:  14.8% for petitions supported by one amicus brief versus 
a grant rate of 3.8% overall.  Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1529.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347935 
	
	
2019]  The Supreme Court Bar at the Bar of Patents –	DRAFT 21 
 
TABLE 3.  CERT.-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT 
CASES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
The filing of two to four amicus briefs increases the grant rate across all cases, 
but the magnitude of the increase is far more pronounced in patent cases 
specifically.  In 2002, across all cases, 33.3% of petitions accompanied by two to 
four amicus briefs were granted—about double the grant rate of 15.1% for petitions 
accompanied by a single amicus brief.78  By 2010, however, the grant rates had 
become almost identical:  17.4% of petitions accompanied by two to four amicus 
briefs were granted versus a grate rate of 17.2% for petitions accompanied by a 
single amicus brief.  In 2016, the percentages spread apart slightly, but not by much:  
17.0% of petitions accompanied by two to four amicus briefs were granted versus 
13.9% of petitions accompanied by a single amicus brief.79   
In patent cases, by contrast, the grant rate increases nearly fourfold when two 
to four amicus briefs are filed at the cert. stage, from 6.1% for cases with one amicus 
brief to 23.2% in cases with two to four amicus briefs, as illustrated on Table 3 
                                               
78 Again, for more detailed data about amicus brief filings in all cases in the 2002, 2010, and 
2016 Terms, see infra app’x B-D. 
79 None of these differences are statistically significant.  Even for the large spread in 2002, p = 
0.155.   
Amicus	briefs	
filed Total Denied Granted %	Granted
0 471 458 13 2.8%
1 49 46 3 6.1%
2 32 26 6 18.8%
3 17 12 5 29.4%
4 7 5 2 28.6%
5 2 1 1 50.0%
6 2 0 2 100.0%
7 2 0 2 100.0%
8 2 1 1 50.0%
9 2 0 2 100.0%
11 2 0 2 100.0%
22 1 1 0 0.0%
0	or	1 520 504 16 3.1%
2	to	4 56 43 13 23.2%
5	or	more 13 3 10 76.9%
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above.80  And this is not a function of the granted patent cases with two to four 
amicus briefs occurring in an earlier era, when there was a larger spread in the 
overall numbers.  Rather, nine of the 13 granted cases with two to four amicus briefs 
were granted in the 2010 Term or later.  
Patent cases in which five or more amicus briefs are filed at the cert. stage are 
extremely likely to be granted.  Out of 13 petitions accompanied by five or more 
amicus briefs, the court granted 10 (76.9%).  Though we are dealing with relatively 
small numbers, that grant rate for patent cases is roughly double the grant rate 
across all types of cases (not just patent cases) with a similarly large number of 
amicus briefs:  in the 2002 Term, the Court granted three of seven petitions 
accompanied by five or more amicus briefs (42.9%); in 2010, 5 of 16 (31.3%); and 
in 2016, 9 of 23 (39.1%).81  
In short, my data confirms the overall correlation between the presence of 
amicus briefs at the cert. stage and the likelihood of a cert. grant.  Most intriguingly, 
it suggests that the correlation between the number of amicus briefs and the 
likelihood of a cert. grant is more important in patent cases than in other areas of 
law.   
C. The Solicitor General 
The Solicitor General (SG) is a uniquely influential litigant at the Supreme 
Court, both at the cert. stage and on the merits.  In patent cases, the Solicitor General 
commonly becomes involved when the Court invites the SG to file a brief 
expressing the views of the United States.  This happened on 31 of the 589 patent 
petitions in my dataset, as I discuss in more detail below.82   
A call for the views of the Solicitor General is a strong indication that the Court 
is interested in a case.83  According to my data, across all types of cases (not just 
patent cases), the mere issuance of a CVSG makes it over ten times more likely that 
the Court will grant cert.  Though the Court’s overall grant rate is about 4%,84 from 
2002 through 2016, the Court granted 139 of the 308 petitions on which it issued a 
CVSG, or 45.1%.  (That figure excludes petitions that were GVR’d or dismissed 
due to settlement.)  Though the mere issuance of a CVSG order dramatically 
increases the likelihood of a cert. grant, the SG’s recommendation does matter:  as 
                                               
80 This difference is statistically significant (p = .012). 
81 Lazarus’s study of the 2005 Term reported that six out of 10 petitions supported by five or 
more amicus briefs were granted.  See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1529.  
82 See infra Part III.C. 
83 See Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the 
Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35, 38 (2010). 
84 See supra fig. 3. 
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discussed in more detail below, the Court follows the SG’s recommendation to 
grant or deny cert. more than three-quarters of the time.85   
In an article published roughly a decade ago, John Duffy highlighted the 
Solicitor General’s role in shaping the Supreme Court’s then-nascent docket of 
patent cases.86  As Duffy reported, before the 2000 Term, the Court had issued a 
CVSG in only one patent case ever.87  In 2000, however, the Court issued CVSGs 
in three patent cases,88 and that trend has continued to this day, right alongside the 
growing number of patent cases decided on the merits.  Since 2000, the Court has 
issued an average of 2.18 CVSGs in Federal Circuit patent cases per Term.  And, 
since 2004, the Court has issued at least one CVSG in a patent case in every Term 
except one, as Figure 4 below indicates.89   
                                               
85 See infra fig. 6. 
86 John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 518 (2010). 
87 Id. at 525-27.  The case was Barr Labs. v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 515 U.S. 1130 (1995). 
88 Duffy, supra note 86, at 529-30. 
89 The analysis that follows, which focuses on patent cases arising out of the Federal Circuit, 
excludes one patent-related case arising out of the Ninth Circuit in which the Court issued a CVSG, 
Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2719 (2014).  Note also that Figure 4 excludes a Federal 
Circuit case in which the Court issued a CVSG but that the parties voluntarily dismissed before the 
SG filed its brief, Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 572 
U.S. 1131 (2014), because voluntary dismissals are excluded from my dataset of Federal Circuit 
cert. petitions.  See supra note 39.  Figure 4 does include, however, one case in which the Court 
issued a CVSG but then denied certiorari before the SG filed its brief, Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 
549 U.S. 970 (2006) (denying cert. after the respondent filed a suggestion of mootness, over the 
opposition of the petitioner). 
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FIGURE 4.  CVSGS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, BY TERM ORDER WAS 
ISSUED 
 
The data I have collected neatly illustrates the unusually high degree of 
influence the Solicitor General enjoys at the cert. stage in patent cases.  As Figure 
5 below shows, on cert. petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases that the Court acted 
on from the 2002 through the 2016 Terms, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
Solicitor General’s recommendation to grant or deny cert. over 90% of the time—
in 28 of the 30 cases in which the Solicitor General filed a brief in response to a 
CVSG.90 
                                               
90 Figures 5 and 6 treat each cert. petition as a separate case (that is, as a separate instance of 
agreement or disagreement), even if the Solicitor General filed a single brief containing 
recommendations for multiple petitions.  See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 1, 
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., Nos. 13-896, 13-1044 (U.S. filed Oct. 16, 2014), 2014 WL 
5299431 (patent case, recommending partial grant of the petition in No. 13-896 and denial of the 
cross-petition in No. 13-1044).  Though this methodology causes some petitions presenting similar 
or identical questions to be counted multiple times, see, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae 1-8, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86, 12-88 (U.S. filed Dec. 14, 2012) 
2012 WL 6591478 (non-patent case, recommending denial of three petitions presenting the same 
question), the Solicitor General often recommends different actions on different petitions in a single 
brief, even if those petitions present the same question, see, e.g., Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae 20, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Nos. 03-1230, 03-1234, 
03-1250 (U.S. filed Dec. 17, 2004), 2004 WL 2985237 (non-patent case, recommending different 
actions on each of three petitions challenging a single decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals), 
so counting each petition as a separate case provides, in my view, the most accurate assessment of 
the frequency with which the Court agrees or disagrees with the Solicitor General’s 
recommendation.  It also bears noting that, in the patent-related Kimble case arising out of the Ninth 
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FIGURE 5.  SUPREME COURT AGREEMENT WITH SOLICITOR GENERAL 
RECOMMENDATION ON CERT. IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES WITH A CVSG, 
OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
By contrast, the data I have collected for all cases indicates that the Court agrees 
with the Solicitor General’s recommendation slightly less than 80% of the time, as 
shown on Figure 6 below.91  This difference in the agreement rate between patent 
cases with a CVSG and all cases with a CVSG is statistically significant at the 1% 
level (p = .008). 
                                               
Circuit, mentioned above, see supra notes 62, 89, the SG recommended denying certiorari, but the 
Court granted it.  Including that instance of disagreement would drop the agreement rate reported 
on Figure 5 from 93.3% to 90.3%—still notably higher than the overall agreement rate indicated 
below.  See infra fig. 6.  Lastly, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court issued two CVSG orders 
in Federal Circuit patent cases in the 2016 Term that the Court did not dispose of until the 2017 
Term.  In both of those cases, the Court agreed with the SG’s recommendation.  See Samsung Elecs. 
Co. v. Apple Inc., 138 S. Ct. 420 (2017) (denying cert.); WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical 
Corp., 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018) (granting cert.).  Including those two cases would push the Court-SG 
agreement rate in patent cases even higher. 
91 A prior study using data from 1998 through 2004 reported a similar agreement rate of 78.5%.  
David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari 
Petition Procedures:  The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 276 (2009).  Like that study, the results reported on Figures 5 and 6 are 
limited to cases in which the Solicitor General recommended a straight grant or denial and not, say, 
a recommendation to GVR or to hold the petition pending resolution of another case. 
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FIGURE 6.  SUPREME COURT AGREEMENT WITH SOLICITOR GENERAL 
RECOMMENDATION ON CERT. IN ALL CASES WITH A CVSG, OT2002 THROUGH 
OT2016 
 
Interestingly, the Solicitor General’s sway in patent cases has held steady over 
time, even as the SG’s influence overall appears to have decreased.  The Court has 
disagreed with the SG’s recommendation on cert. in only two Federal Circuit patent 
cases ever, one in which the Court acted on the cert. petition in the 2005 Term92 
and another in 2012.93  Yet, looking at all cases involving a CVSG order during the 
time period of my study, the Court has become far more likely to disagree with the 
SG’s recommendation.  As Figure 7 below indicates, in not a single Term from 
2002 through 2008 did the Court disagree with the SG’s recommendation in more 
than 20% of cases overall, and the disagreement rate was often below 10%.  From 
2009 through 2016, however, the disagreement rate grew markedly:  the Court 
disagreed with the SG’s recommendation over 25% of the time in five of the eight 
Terms during that time period.   
                                               
92 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 999 (2005) (granting cert. 
over the SG’s recommendation to deny).  Ironically, the Court ultimately dismissed the writ of 
certiorari in that case as improvidently granted.  Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 
Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006). 
93  Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 568 U.S. 936 (2012) (granting cert. over the SG’s 
recommendation to deny); see also supra notes 62, 89 (discussing Kimble v. Marvel Enters, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015), a patent-related case arising from the Ninth Circuit in which the Supreme 
Court granted cert. over the SG’s recommendation to deny). 
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FIGURE 7.  SUPREME COURT AGREEMENT WITH SOLICITOR GENERAL 
RECOMMENDATION ON CERT. IN ALL CASES WITH A CVSG, TERM BY TERM 
 
It is worth noting that the increase in disagreement rate beginning in 2009 
coincides with switch from a Republican presidential administration (and a 
Republican-appointed Solicitor General) to a Democratic one.  Ignoring the Terms 
during which control of the White House changed political parties (2008 and 2016), 
the disagreement rate from 2002 through 2007 was a mere 10.0% (10 of 100), but 
from 2009 through 2015 it was nearly three times higher—29.8% (45 of 151).  This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (p < .001).  As I explain in 
greater detail in a companion essay to this article,94 this development challenges 
the conventional wisdom that the Justices are strongly inclined to follow the SG’s 
cert. recommendation even if they disagree with the SG ideologically.95  Instead, 
my findings are consistent with recent empirical literature demonstrating the 
decline of Supreme Court deference to the President.96   
Returning to patent cases—and in view of the Supreme Court’s growing docket 
of patent disputes—it bears mention that the SG recommends the Court grant 
                                               
94 Paul R. Gugliuzza, Supreme Court Ideology and Deference to the Solicitor General (Jan. 14, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
95 See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 66 (2012) (relying on data from 1970 through 1993). 
96 See Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Supreme Court Deference to the President, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 846-47 (2018) (finding that, in cases decided on the merits, the executive 
branch’s win-rate steadily declined from 77% in 1980 to 48% in 2015). 
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certiorari in a greater percentage of patent cases than overall.  Specifically, the SG 
recommended a grant in 13 of the 30 Federal Circuit patent cases (43.3%) in which 
it filed a brief in response to a CVSG from 2002 through 2016, versus 80 of 294 
cases overall (27.2%).97  In addition, the Court granted every single patent petition 
the SG recommended granting.98  Thus, even if the SG’s influence is declining 
overall, the SG’s influence at the cert. stage in patent cases seems alive and well. 
* * * 
This part of the article has made three primary points.  First, the Supreme 
Court’s interest in patent cases has grown in the past two decades, both in terms of 
the raw number of cases on the docket and the likelihood of a cert. petition in a 
patent case being granted.  Second, the presence of amicus briefs—and in particular 
the number of them—appears to be an important indicator of the likelihood of cert. 
being granted in a patent case, perhaps more important than in other areas of law.  
And third, the Solicitor General’s recommendation seems to play a vital role in the 
Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant cert. in a patent case—again possibly 
even more than in other areas of law.  In the next part of the article, I introduce an 
additional development that corresponds to the Court’s increasing tendency to grant 
cert. in patent cases:  the more frequent presence of elite Supreme Court litigators 
in patent disputes. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT BAR AT THE BAR OF PATENTS 
To begin, some background on the Supreme Court bar.99  During the nineteenth 
century, a small group of lawyers including Daniel Webster, Francis Scott Key, and 
Luther Martin dominated oral argument at the Supreme Court.  This was mostly a 
function of geography.  At the time, it was simply too difficult for leading lawyers 
in New York or Boston to travel to Washington, D.C.  As travel became easier in 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, the Supreme Court bar lost its 
cohesiveness.  For most of the twentieth century, there were few if any private 
lawyers who had a significant, sustained Supreme Court practice.  That began to 
change in the 1980s as veterans of the Solicitor General’s office began to form their 
own private practices specializing in appellate and Supreme Court litigation.100  
                                               
97  Because of the relatively small numbers, this difference is not statistically significant 
(p = .101), but, again, the figures reported in the text represent the entire population of relevant 
cases, not a sample. 
98 In the overall dataset, the Supreme Court disregarded the SG’s grant recommendation in 4 of 
294 cases (1.4%).  A small fraction, to be sure, but not zero. 
99 For a detailed recounting of this story, see KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: 
LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 12-27 (1993). 
100 As Lazarus reports, this trend began in 1985 when Sidley Austin hired Rex Lee, President 
Reagan’s first Solicitor General, to create a Supreme Court and appellate practice in the firm’s D.C. 
office.  Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1498.  After Lee presented oral argument in a remarkable six 
cases in the 1986 Term, other firms quickly followed suit by hiring former Solicitors General Ken 
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Those specialized practices were, and mostly still are, housed within large law 
firms, though there are some small firms (and, increasingly, law school clinics) 
dedicated entirely to appellate and Supreme Court practice.101   
By many accounts, this specialized private bar has reformed the Supreme 
Court’s agenda by encouraging the Court to hear more cases of interest to the 
business community, and it has reshaped the law by obtaining numerous rulings in 
favor of its clients, which are often the largest corporations in the world.102  As I 
show below, the elite bar also appears to have been successful at enticing the 
Supreme Court to hear more patent cases.  Those lawyers’ ultimate impact on the 
substance of patent law is, however, less clear, in part because Supreme Court 
merits decisions in patent cases often involve elite lawyers on both sides of the 
dispute. 
A.  The Growth of the Elite Supreme Court Bar 
Figure 8 below presents empirical evidence showing how a small number of 
lawyers are increasingly dominating Supreme Court litigation generally.  As that 
figure illustrates, the number of advocates who qualify as elite under this article’s 
definition (five or more arguments in the Term under review and the ten preceding 
Terms, combined) has steadily grown from 2002 through the present, from a low 
of 53 lawyers in 2003 to a high of 81 lawyers in 2016—an increase of 52.8%.103 
                                               
Starr (Kirkland & Ellis), Seth Waxman (Wilmer Cutler), Ted Olson (Gibson Dunn), and Drew Days 
(Morrison & Foerster), as well as Starr’s Principal Deputy Solicitor General, John Roberts (Hogan 
& Hartson).  Id. at 1499-1500. 
101 Well-known small firms dedicated to appellate and Supreme Court practice and staffed by 
elite Supreme Court lawyers include Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick (David Frederick, 
among others) and Goldstein & Russell (Tom Goldstein, among others).  The most successful law 
school clinic focused on Supreme Court advocacy is at Stanford Law School and is directed by elite 
Supreme Court lawyers Jeff Fisher and Pam Karlan. 
102 Id. at 1490-91; accord Biskupic et al., supra note 15. 
103  For another empirical analysis presenting evidence of increased specialization among 
Supreme Court advocates, see Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as 
Advocates, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 40), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125357 (showing a decline in the number of different advocates 
presenting oral argument at the Supreme Court starting in the mid-1980s). 
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FIGURE 8.  NUMBER OF LAWYERS WITH FIVE OR MORE ORAL ARGUMENTS IN 
CURRENT AND TEN PRECEDING TERMS, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
Of course, the Office of the Solicitor General has always provided a group of 
lawyers specializing in Supreme Court litigation, and many of those lawyers are 
captured on Figure 8.  The growth of a dominating, elite private bar is more 
apparent if we amend the definition of elite and exclude arguments that a lawyer 
conducted while employed by the government.  Under that definition, the number 
of advocates who qualify as elite has grown from 22 in 2002, 2003, and 2004 to 39 
in 2016—an increase of 77.3%, as depicted in Figure 9 below.  
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FIGURE 9.  NUMBER OF LAWYERS WITH FIVE OR MORE ORAL ARGUMENTS IN 
CURRENT AND TEN PRECEDING TERMS, EXCLUDING CASES ARGUED AS A 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
In the analysis that follows, I include all oral arguments in determining whether 
a lawyer qualifies as elite, on the rationale that a Supreme Court argument in any 
capacity helps the lawyer develop expertise and the reputation among the Justices 
and their law clerks that could influence the Court’s decisionmaking. 
Perhaps most revealing about the emergence of an elite private-sector Supreme 
Court bar is Figure 10 below.  It shows the percentage of all Supreme Court oral 
arguments that were delivered by elite advocates on a Term-by-Term basis, 
excluding arguments presented by attorneys employed by the government.104  As 
that figure illustrates, as recently as 2005, less than a quarter of the private-sector 
lawyers presenting oral argument at the Supreme Court met my definition of elite.  
A decade later, that proportion had doubled:  in both the 2015 and 2016 Terms, 
47% of all private-sector lawyers presenting oral argument at the Supreme Court 
qualified as elite.105 
                                               
104 For example, lawyers in the Office of the Solicitor General, lawyers working in a state 
attorney general’s office, city and county prosecutors, and state and federal public defenders.   
105 A linear regression of the data underlying Figure 10 shows statistical significance (p < .001) 
and a positive slope (ß = .020).   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347935 
	
 
32 The Supreme Court Bar at the Bar of Patents –	DRAFT [2019 
FIGURE 10.  PERCENTAGE OF NON-GOVERNMENT LAWYERS PRESENTING ORAL 
ARGUMENT WHO QUALIFIED AS ELITE, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
   
B.  The Supreme Court Bar in Patent Cases:  At the Cert.-Stage 
1. Elites and the Growing Supreme Court Patent Docket.  The transformation 
of the Supreme Court bar and the Court’s docket raises the question of central 
relevance to this article:  Has the elite Supreme Court bar spurred the Court to hear 
more patent cases, too?  Patent law would certainly qualify as a topic of interest to 
the large corporations often represented by elite Supreme Court lawyers—at least 
more than other staples of the Supreme Court’s docket such as criminal law, 
criminal procedure, habeas corpus, and civil rights litigation.   
My data indicate that the elite Supreme Court bar has become increasingly 
involved in patent cases in recent years, most importantly, at the cert. stage.  Figure 
11 below shows the proportion of cert. petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases filed 
by elite advocates from 2002 through 2016.106  As that figure illustrates, as recently 
as a decade ago, the number of patent petitions filed by elite advocates was small—
rarely much more than 10% in any given Term.  Of the 283 cert. petitions filed in 
Federal Circuit patent cases from 2002 through 2009, only 29 (10.2%) were filed 
by elite advocates.  Since then, however, the elite bar’s involvement in patent cases 
has become more than twice as frequent.  From 2010 through 2016, elite lawyers 
filed 67 of the 305 cert. petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases (22.0%).  This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (p < .001). 
                                               
106 The analysis in this part of the article excludes the one cert. petition in my dataset that was 
filed by the Solicitor General (which the Court granted), Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431 (2012). 
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FIGURE 11.  CERT. PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES FILED BY 
ELITE/NON-ELITE ADVOCATES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
The increase in the proportion of cert. petitions filed by elite advocates neatly 
corresponds to the Supreme Court’s increased tendency to grant cert. in patent 
cases, as discussed above and summarized on Table 4 below, which compares the 
percentage of cert. petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases filed by elite lawyers 
with the Court’s grant rate in patent cases.  Like the increased participation of elite 
lawyers, the Court’s increased proclivity to grant cert. in patent cases is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (p = .009).107   
TABLE 4.  CERT. PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, OT2002 
THROUGH OT2016 
 
The correlation between the increasing involvement of elite lawyers and the 
growth of the Supreme Court’s patent docket does not, of course, prove causation.  
Yet aspects of my data suggest that elite advocates have influenced the Court to 
hear more patent cases.  As Table 5 below shows, from 2002 through 2016, the 
Supreme Court granted 15.6% of cert. petitions filed by elite advocates in Federal 
                                               
107 See supra fig. 2 and accompanying text for more detailed discussion of the data underlying 
Table 4. 
% Filed By Elites % Granted
2002-09 10.2% 3.9%
2010-16 22.0% 9.2%
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Circuit patent cases as compared to only 4.7% of petitions filed by non-elites in 
Federal Circuit patent cases, another difference that is statistically significant at the 
1% level (p = .005).108  Put slightly differently:  the Supreme Court is 3.3 times 
more likely to grant cert. when a petition in a Federal Circuit patent case is filed by 
an elite advocate as compared to a non-elite.109  
TABLE 5.  GRANT RATES ON CERT. PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, 
OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
Another way of quantifying the success that elite lawyers have had in shaping 
the Supreme Court patent docket:  From 2002 through 2016, cert. petitions filed by 
elite lawyers accounted for 16.3% of the petitions filed in Federal Circuit patent 
cases, as one can calculate from Table 5 above and as illustrated on Figure 12 
below.  Yet, as Figure 13 indicates, petitions filed by elite lawyers accounted for 
nearly 40% of the petitions granted by the Supreme Court in Federal Circuit patent 
cases (15 of 38).  That difference is, again, statistically significant at the 1% level 
(p = .007). 
                                               
108 The overall grant rate for Federal Circuit patent cases was 6.6%, as discussed above.  See 
supra fig. 3. 
109 Excluding the 43 petitions in my dataset (all denied) that were filed pro se (even though 
some of those litigants appear to be lawyers themselves), elite lawyers still enjoy a grant rate over 
three times as large as non-elites (15.6% versus 5.1%), and the difference between elites and non-




% Granted 15.6% 4.7%
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FIGURE 12.  CERT. PETITIONS FILED IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, OT2002 
THROUGH OT2016 
 
FIGURE 13.  CERT. PETITIONS GRANTED IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, 
OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
Of course, it is possible that causation may run the opposite direction from what 
I have suggested:  that is, the Supreme Court may not be interested in patent cases 
because of elite lawyers, rather, elite lawyers may have gravitated toward patent 
cases because the Supreme Court became interested in patent law.  But elite lawyers 
have been disproportionately involved in granted patent cases from the very 
beginning of the Supreme Court’s recent surge of interest in the field.  Of the 11 
patent cases the Court granted from 2002 through 2009, elite lawyers served as 
counsel of record on four, or 36.4%—roughly in line with the 39.5% figure reported 
on Figure 13 for the entire time period of my study.  And although elite lawyers 
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have become modestly more successful at obtaining cert. over the years, the 
difference is slight and not statistically significant.  From 2002 through 2009, the 
Court granted four of the 29 cert. petitions in patent cases filed by elite lawyers 
(13.8%).  From 2010 to 2016, the Court granted 11 of 67 (16.4%).110  Moreover, in 
the 2002 and 2003 Terms—the two earliest Terms in my dataset and two of the five 
Terms in which the Court granted cert. in zero patent cases—elite lawyers were 
noticeably absent from patent cases, filing only three of the 67 cert. petitions in 
those Terms, or 4.5%—far below 16.3% rate of elite participation for the entire 
period of my study, as reported on Figure 12.  In short, even if the Court’s increased 
interest in patent law has driven the elite bar to patent cases in recent years, this 
data suggests that the Court’s initial interest in patent law—particularly from 2004 
through 2009—was linked to the newfound presence of elite lawyers in patent 
cases. 
2. Elites and Amicus Briefs.  As discussed above, cert. petitions accompanied 
by amicus briefs are about eight times more likely to be granted than petitions filed 
without amicus briefs, and that general observation holds true for patent cases.  
Moreover, in patent cases, the sheer number of amicus briefs filed appears to have 
unusual importance.  Thus, the ability to “wrangle” amicus briefs out of 
sympathetic parties—important in all types of Supreme Court litigation 111 —
appears to have an even greater importance in patent cases.   
The ability to recruit amici is, in fact, a key benefit of hiring elite Supreme Court 
counsel.  As Allison Orr Larsen and Neal Devins note in their exploration of what 
they term the “amicus machine,” the notion that amicus briefs in Supreme Court 
cases are “organically developed by concerned interest groups” is outdated and 
incomplete.112  Rather, Larsen and Devins explain, sophisticated, expert Supreme 
Court counsel actively recruit amici and coordinate their message to the Court.113  
Larsen and Devins highlight the role of the person they call the “amicus wrangler”:  
a lawyer who solicits supportive amicus briefs from sympathetic businesses or 
organizations—“much like a trial lawyer . . . selecting a roster of expert witnesses 
for trial.”114  The amicus wrangler is sometimes the counsel of record, sometimes 
another lawyer on the team, but always a seasoned Supreme Court advocate in his 
or her own right.115   
Perhaps not surprisingly, my data indicates that elite advocates’ success at 
wrangling amicus briefs carries over to patent cases.  As Table 6 below indicates, 
                                               
110 p = .743. 
111 See Larsen & Devins, supra note 67, at 1919. 
112 Id. at 1905. 
113 Id. at 1906. 
114 Id. at 1922. 
115 See id. at 1922-24. 
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at least one cert.-stage amicus brief was filed in 51.0% (49 of 96) of Federal Circuit 
patent cases in which the petitioner’s counsel of record was an elite advocate, and 
two or more briefs were filed nearly a third of the time (in 31 of 96 cases, or 32.3%).  
(As Table 3 above indicated, the presence of two or more amicus briefs makes a 
cert. petition in a patent case over five times more likely than average to be 
granted.116)  By comparison, at least one amicus brief was filed in only 14.0% (69 
of 492) of Federal Circuit patent cases in which the petitioner was not represented 
by elite counsel, and in only 7.5% of those cases (37 of 492) were more than two 
amicus briefs filed.117  
Though elite counsel are significantly more likely to elicit (or, better, solicit) 
amicus briefs and to have their petitions granted, my data also indicate that a large 
number of amicus briefs can negate the advantage enjoyed by elite lawyers.  Even 
the presence of one cert.-stage amicus brief closes the gap between elite and non-
elite grant rates substantially.  As Table 6 below shows, of the 49 elite petitions 
accompanied by at least one amicus brief, the Court granted 13, or 26.5%.  By 
contrast, of the 69 non-elite petitions accompanied by at least one amicus brief, the 
Court also granted 13, or 18.8%.  That gap is much smaller than it is across all 
patent cases (a 15.6% grant rate for elites versus a 4.7% grant rate for non-elites), 
and it is not statistically significant (p = .335).   
Focusing on petitions accompanied by two or more amicus briefs, the elite bar’s 
advantage almost entirely disappears (though the numbers begin to get small).  
From 2002 through 2016, the Court granted 34.4% (11 of 32) of petitions filed by 
elite advocates and accompanied by two or more amicus briefs.  By comparison, 
the Court granted 32.4% (12 of 37) petitions filed by non-elites and accompanied 
by two or more amicus briefs.   
                                               
116 Specifically, the Court granted 33.3% of patent cert. petitions accompanied by two or more 
amicus briefs (23 of 69) versus an overall grant rate of 6.6% in patent cases. 
117 Both of these differences are statistically significant (p < .001).  
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TABLE 6.  CERT. PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, OT2002 
THROUGH OT2016:  ELITES, NON-ELITES, AND AMICI 
Petitions Filed by Elite Advocates 
  Total 
With at least one 
amicus brief 
With two or more 
amicus briefs 
Filed 96 49 32 
Granted 15 13 11 
% Granted 15.6% 26.5% 34.4% 
       
Petitions Filed by Non-Elite Advocates 
  Total 
With at least one 
amicus brief 
With two or more 
amicus briefs 
Filed 492 69 37 
Granted 23 13 12 
% Granted 4.7% 18.8% 32.4% 
 
3. Elites and CVSGs.  As discussed above, a CVSG order makes it over ten 
times more likely that the Supreme Court will grant cert. across all types of cases.  
In Federal Circuit patent cases specifically, the effect of a CVSG is less 
pronounced, but still significant.  From 2002 through 2016, the Court granted 
46.7% (14 of 30) of Federal Circuit patent cases in which it issued a CVSG and the 
SG filed a brief—a little more than seven times higher than the overall patent-case 
grant rate of 6.6%. 
That leads to more potentially bad news for non-elite advocates:  cert. petitions 
filed by elite advocates in Federal Circuit patent cases are far more likely to elicit a 
CVSG than petitions filed by non-elites.  As shown on Figure 14 below, the Court 
issued a CVSG on 14 of the 96 cert. petitions filed by elite advocates in my dataset 
(14.6%) as compared to 17 of the 492 cert. petitions filed by non-elites (3.5%), a 
difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level (p = .003).118  (Elites’ 
                                               
118 Though my dataset includes only petitions the Court disposed of from the 2002 through 2016 
Terms, it is worth noting that in both of the Federal Circuit patent cases in which the Court issued a 
CVSG order in the 2016 Term but that the Court did not dispose of until the 2017 Term featured 
elite advocates representing the petitioner.  See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2320 
(2017); WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 137 S. Ct. 2206 (2017). 
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advantage would be even higher if I included a fifteenth petition that obtained a 
CVSG but was voluntarily dismissed by the parties before the SG filed its brief.119) 
Interestingly, though petitions filed by elite advocates are four times more likely 
to elicit a CVSG, the Solicitor General’s proclivity to recommend granting or 
denying cert. is not significantly different for elite versus non-elite petitions.  On 
petitions filed by elite advocates, the Solicitor General recommended granting cert. 
in six of its 14 briefs; on petitions filed by non-elites, the Solicitor General 
recommended granting cert. in six of 16 briefs.  (One non-elite petition in my 
dataset of Federal Circuit cert. petitions that obtained a CVSG was denied before 
the SG filed its brief.120) 
FIGURE 14.  CVSG ORDERS AND SOLICITOR GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
CERT. PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 
 
Though these are small numbers, they have at least two possible implications.  
First, they suggest that the Solicitor General’s recommendation is unaffected by the 
identity of the lawyer on the cert. petition.  This is important because many 
members of the elite Supreme Court bar formerly worked in the Office of the 
Solicitor General.  It would therefore not have been surprising to find that lawyers 
                                               
119 Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 572 U.S. 1131 
(2014).  As explained above, however, I exclude voluntary dismissals from my dataset of cert. 
petitions in Federal Circuit cases.  See supra note 39. 
120 Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 549 U.S. 970 (2006) (denying cert. after the respondent filed a 
suggestion of mootness, over the opposition of the petitioner). 
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in that office are more inclined to recommend a grant when a petition is filed by a 
former colleague than when it is filed by an unfamiliar lawyer.  My data suggest, 
however, that any concern about a revolving door or capture is trumped by other 
considerations—perhaps most notably the office’s oft-stated desire to preserve its 
reputation with the Justices as a neutral voice about the desirability of review.121  A 
second possibility is that, despite the disparity in the frequency of CVSGs in cases 
filed by elites versus non-elites, the Court is doing a relatively good job at 
identifying cases that are at least plausibly worthy of review.  Hence, the Solicitor 
General recommends a grant in roughly the same proportion of CVSG cases 
regardless of whether the petition is filed by an elite or non-elite.   
C.  The Supreme Court Bar in Patent Cases:  On the Merits, Briefly 
By many accounts, Supreme Court patent law has taken a decidedly “anti-
patent” turn over the past two decades.122  On first blush, it is tempting to attribute 
that development to the elite Supreme Court bar.  My data indicates that elite 
lawyers disproportionately seek review on behalf of accused infringers (as opposed 
to patentees), who would stand to benefit from case law that makes it easier to 
challenge patent validity and to defeat a claim of infringement.  Of the 38 cert. 
petitions in my dataset that were filed by private parties and that the Court granted, 
26 (68.4%) were filed by an accused infringer, as compared to only 12 that were 
filed by a patentee or patent applicant.  But 80% of the granted petitions filed by 
elite lawyers (12 of 15) were on behalf of accused infringers.  Non-elite lawyers, 
by contrast, represented accused infringers only 60.9% of the time (in 14 of 23 
cases).  That difference, however, is not statistically significant (p = .208).    
Moreover, elite lawyers’ disproportionate success at obtaining review does not 
translate to disproportionate success on the merits.  Part of the reason is that the 
merits stage of Supreme Court patent cases not infrequently involves elite lawyers 
on both sides.  As Table 7 below indicates, 13 of the 41 patent-related cases that 
                                               
121 See, e.g., Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 
OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 597 (1986) (“[T]here is a widely held, and I believe substantially accurate, 
impression that the Solicitor General’s office provides the Court from one administration to 
another—and largely without regard to either the political party or the personality of the particular 
Solicitor General—with advocacy which is more objective, more dispassionate, more competent, 
and more respectful of the Court as an institution than it gets from any other lawyer or group of 
lawyers.”). 
122 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Institutional Fracture in Intellectual Property Law: The 
Supreme Court Versus Congress, 102 MINN. L. REV. 803, 811-12 (2017) (finding that 23 of the 29 
Supreme Court patent decisions from the 2002 Term through the 2015 Term “substantively affected 
patentee rights in a measureable direction” and that 18 of those 23 decisions “weakened patent 
protection”).  But cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced 
Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1009 & n.8 (2016) (noting that several recent 
Supreme Court decisions on induced infringement “have favored the patent owner for the most part” 
and citing additional examples of “pro-patent rulings”). 
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were orally argued from 2002 through 2017123 (31.7%) featured elite advocates on 
both sides—either conducting oral argument, as counsel of record on the primary 
merits brief, or both.124  Another 10 cases (24.4%) featured non-elite advocates on 
both sides.  Five cases featured non-elite advocates squaring off against lawyers 
from the Office of the Solicitor General, with the SG’s lawyers winning three times, 
and the private advocate winning twice.  In only 13 of 41 cases (31.7%) did an elite 
advocate square off against a non-elite.  Non-elite advocates actually enjoyed a 
slight edge in those cases, prevailing seven out of 13 times.   
TABLE 7.  ELITE AND NON-ELITE ADVOCATES IN SUPREME COURT PATENT CASES 
HEARD ON THE MERITS, OT2002 THROUGH OT2017 
 
Prior studies examining whether experience as a Supreme Court litigator 
translates into favorable results on the merits have reached mixed results.125  My 
findings are consistent with that ambiguity. 
                                               
123 The total number of orally argued cases in this portion of the article is different than the 
number of Federal Circuit cert. petitions granted (discussed elsewhere in the paper) for several 
reasons.  First, I include the case in which the cert. petition was filed by the Solicitor General, see 
supra note 106, when discussing merits cases.  Second, two pairs of Federal Circuit cases in my 
dataset were argued in tandem at the Supreme Court by the same lawyers, and each pair was decided 
in a single opinion:  Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017) (consolidated with Amgen 
Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 15-1195), and Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) 
(consolidated with Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 14-1520).  I treat each pair as a single case in 
this part of the article.  Third, I include in my discussion of merits cases the three patent-related 
cases that the Court decided from 2002 through 2017 that originated outside of the Federal Circuit.  
See supra note 62.  Finally, I include a case in which the cert. petition was granted and the case was 
decided in the 2017 Term, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018). 
124 For this portion of the article, I treat elite advocates in private practice separately from elite 
advocates in the Office of the Solicitor General. 
125 Compare Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: 
When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 
275 (2007) (finding that experienced Supreme Court litigators win more frequently than novices in 
cases without strong ideological valence), with Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, The Success of 
Former Solicitors General in Private Practice: Costly and Unnecessary?, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
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* * * 
The Supreme Court bar has arrived at the bar of patents.  The increasing 
proportion of cert. petitions in patent cases filed by elite advocates neatly 
corresponds with the growing number of patent cases being decided by the Supreme 
Court on the merits.  Though elite advocates seem to have helped reshape the 
Court’s agenda in patent law, it is not clear that they are responsible for changing 
the substance of patent law in any consistent way. 
IV. LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS 
It bears repeating that the correlation between elite lawyers’ increasing 
participation in Supreme Court patent cases and the Supreme Court’s growing 
patent docket suggests but does not prove causation.  As noted in the introduction, 
many factors have likely played a role in spurring the Court to hear more patent 
cases. 126   The main objective of this article has been to inject an additional 
consideration into the discussion:  the identity of the lawyers seeking Supreme 
Court review.   
The elite bar’s involvement in patent cases may, in fact, be inextricably 
intertwined with the other factors causing the Court’s patent docket to grow, 
creating a sort of “chicken or egg” problem.  For instance, the major spike in 
Supreme Court patent decisions began in the 2010 Term,127 the term during which 
Congress passed the America Invents Act—the most significant revision to the 
patent laws in over half a century.  The Act, as noted, has provided the basis for 
several recent Supreme Court decisions and numerous cert. petitions.128  Yet the 
Act was itself a response to the increasing quantity and prominence of patent 
litigation,129 as reflected in the fourteen Supreme Court patent decisions in the 
decade preceding the Act—many of which were handled by elite lawyers.130  
There is also an endogeneity concern in trying to draw a causal link between 
the presence of elite advocates and the Supreme Court’s increased tendency to grant 
                                               
in the Office of the Solicitor General than an attorney with a similar level of experience who did not 
work in that office). 
126 See supra notes 6-14. 
127 See supra fig. 1. 
128 See supra notes 13-14. 
129 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39 (2011) (House Report on the America Invents Act: “[T]he 
need to modernize our patent laws has found expression in the courts, as well.  The Supreme Court 
has reversed the Federal Circuit in six of the patent-related cases that it has heard since the beginning 
of the 109th Congress.”).   
130 Specifically, five of the fourteen granted petitions in patent cases from 2004 through 2010, 
or 35.7%, featured elite advocates as counsel of record, only slightly below the 39.5% rate of elite 
representation on all granted patent petitions in my study.  See supra fig. 13. 
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cert. in patent cases.  Parties who think they have a good chance of obtaining cert. 
might be more willing to pay the high fees of an elite lawyer,131 and the parties who 
can afford to hire an elite lawyer (mostly large corporations) might be those most 
likely to attract the Court’s attention in the first place.132  Relatedly, an elite lawyer 
might be more willing to take a case (perhaps even without a fee133) if the lawyer 
thinks the case has a strong chance of obtaining cert.  In short, it could be that the 
substance of the cases is dispositive; elite lawyers just end up being associated with 
the cases that are most cert.-worthy.    
Yet there remain good reasons to think that having an elite lawyer makes a 
difference to the Court’s decisionmaking at the cert. stage, even if it is not the only 
factor.  For starters, the data above illustrate that elite lawyers are remarkably able 
at obtaining amicus support for their cert. petitions.  The fact that elite lawyers’ 
advantage in obtaining cert. largely disappears when we examine only petitions 
accompanied by amicus briefs134 suggests that elite lawyers’ exceptional ability to 
wrangle amicus support may be the most important explanation for their 
disproportionate success in obtaining cert. in patent cases.   
Moreover, there have been several situations in which the Court has passed on 
issues when presented by non-elites but then granted the same issue when presented 
by an elite.  For example, over the course of more than a decade, the Court received 
numerous petitions seeking review of Federal Circuit precedent holding that patent 
claim construction is a pure question of law subject to de novo review on appeal.135  
The Court finally granted review on that issue (and overturned the Federal Circuit’s 
precedent) in a case in which petitioner’s counsel of record was a member of the 
elite.136  Similarly, over roughly the same time period, the Court received many 
petitions involving the scope and applicability of the statutory presumption of 
patent validity found in 35 U.S.C. § 282,137 which the Federal Circuit had long held 
                                               
131 See David Lat, Top Supreme Court Advocates Charge How Much Per Hour?, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Aug. 10, 2015), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/08/top-supreme-court-advocates-charge-how-
much-per-hour. 
132  See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 16, 2008, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html. 
133 See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1557 (noting that Supreme Court advocates often take cases 
pro bono or for reduced fees because “they bolster the attorney’s overall credentials as a Supreme 
Court practitioner for those cases that do have the potential for generating significant fees”). 
134 See supra tbl. 6. 
135 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Memorex Prods. Inc. v. SanDisk Corp., No. 05-
546 (U.S. filed Oct. 6, 2005), 2005 WL 2508049. 
136 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015); see also Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, Teva, 135 S. Ct. 831, 2014 WL 230926 (William Jay).   
137 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden of establishing 
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
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required a patent challenger to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.138  
The Court denied all of those petitions, but, in 2010, it granted a petition—filed by 
an elite lawyer—that broadly presented the question of whether § 282 carries with 
it a clear and convincing standard of proof.139  Despite that decision at the cert. 
stage in favor of an elite lawyer, the Court ultimately affirmed the Federal Circuit’s 
precedent140 (a somewhat unusual outcome).141  And during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s the Court received several petitions challenging Federal Circuit case 
law that had rendered the patent-eligible subject matter requirement effectively a 
dead letter.142  But the Court refrained from granting cert. on that issue until 2005, 
when it granted a petition filed by an elite lawyer that did not even explicitly raise 
an eligibility argument143  and over the Solicitor General’s recommendation to 
deny.144  (The SG was ultimately vindicated when the Court dismissed the petition 
as improvidently granted.145)   
In addition, although the Court has frequently passed on issues that it ultimately 
reviewed at the urging of an elite lawyer, the Court has in other circumstances 
quickly granted somewhat esoteric issues pressed by elite lawyers in the first 
instance.  For example, over the past two years, the Court has granted cert. in two 
cases involving patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)—a relatively obscure 
provision making it illegal to sell components of patented inventions to be 
assembled outside the United States.146  Petitioner’s counsel of record in both cases 
qualified as elite.147   
                                               
138 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., No. 99-
1882 (U.S. filed May 23, 2000), 2000 WL 34013891 (presenting the question of whether the clear 
and convincing evidence standard applied to the defense of obviousness-type double patenting). 
139 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 
(2011), 2010 WL 3413088 (Tom Hungar). 
140 i4i, 564 U.S. at 95. 
141 Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 72 (2016) (reporting that the Supreme Court reversed 
or vacated 70% of Federal Circuit decisions reviewed on the merits from OT2006 through OT2015). 
142 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Excel Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., No. 
99-95 (U.S. filed July 13, 1999), 1999 WL 33640012. 
143 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 
548 U.S. 124 (2006), 2004 WL 2505526 (Jonathan Franklin). 
144 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. 124, 2005 WL 
2072283. 
145 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125. 
146 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018); Life Techs. Corp. v. 
Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017). 
147 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2017 WL 678358 (Paul 
Clement); Petition for a Writ of Ceriorari, Life Techs., 137 S. Ct. 734, 2015 WL 3941490 (Carter 
Phillips).  For another relatively recent Supreme Court case on § 271(f) in which the petition was, 
again, filed by an elite lawyer, see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); see also 
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There are, to be sure, other case examples suggesting that elite lawyering is not 
as important as my analysis indicates.  For instance, in the 2016 Term, the Court in 
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC granted a cert. 
petition, filed by a lawyer who did not qualify as elite, challenging the 
constitutionality of the new post-issuance review proceedings created by the 
America Invents Act148—and that was after denying a petition presenting the same 
issue filed by a lawyer who plainly qualifies as elite 149  and who wrangled 
significant amicus support.150  Similarly, in 2005, the Court granted certiorari in 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., on a petition filed by a lawyer who did not 
qualify as elite, to review the “teaching, suggestion, motivation” requirement 
adopted by the Federal Circuit for proving obviousness151—an issue that had been 
presented in cert. petitions several times previously (though not, as far as I can tell, 
by an elite lawyer).152   
That said, even in cases such as Oil States and KSR, traces of elite lawyer effects 
can be found.  Most notably, the counsel of record in both cases had previously 
argued before the Court—just not frequently enough to qualify as elite under the 
definition I use in this article.153  Both petitions also featured former Supreme Court 
clerks on their covers.154  Moreover, the petition in KSR enjoyed significant amicus 
                                               
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 2006 WL 403897 (Ted Olson).  Cases arising 
under § 271(f), it should be noted, almost inevitably involve the potential for extraterritorial 
application of a federal statute—an issue that might capture the Court’s attention regardless of the 
underlying area of substantive law.  Cf. Narechania, supra note 8, at 1376-80 (documenting the 
Supreme Court’s proclivity to grant cert. when “a patent-specific rule stands at odds with the 
approach employed in nearly every other substantive field,” citing Microsoft v. AT&T as an 
example). 
148 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018), 2016 WL 6995217 (Allyson Ho); see also Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 
1370 (holding that the proceedings violate neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment). 
149 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 292, 2016 WL 1729988 (Tom Goldstein). 
150 Eight cert.-stage amicus briefs were filed in the MCM Portfolio case. 
151 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), 2005 
WL 835463 (James Dabney); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 407 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s case 
law). 
152 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Medinol Ltd. v. Johnson & Johnson, 543 U.S. 814 
(2004), 2004 WL 1174638; S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 532 U.S. 974 (2001), 2001 WL 
34124948. 
153 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1202 (2015) (Ho); M&G Polymers 
USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 930 (2015) (Ho); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 827 (2002) (Dabney).   
154 Allyson Ho, counsel of record in Oil States, was a clerk to Justice O’Connor.  And the 
petition in KSR included as counsel John Duffy, a former clerk to Justice Scalia. 
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support:  three amicus briefs were filed at the cert.-stage—a fact that, as discussed 
above, correlates with a grant rate that is four-to-five times greater than average.155  
In future work, I plan to at least partially untangle these causal threads by coding 
the roughly 600 Federal Circuit cert. petitions in my dataset for the substantive 
question presented.  This will allow for more systematic examination of the various 
questions presented to the Supreme Court and help in isolating the impact of elite 
lawyers.  I also intend to code the petitions for other information that is potentially 
relevant to the Supreme Court’s decision to grant or deny cert., such as the mode 
of disposition in the Federal Circuit (precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion, 
or affirmance without opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36),156 whether there 
were separate opinions (concurrences or dissents) at the Federal Circuit,157 and the 
date of the conference at which the Supreme Court considered the petition.158  
Finally, I intend to create a more granular metric of each lawyer’s experience before 
the Supreme Court, taking into account factors such as the number of arguments 
the lawyer has presented before the Court (as the discussion of Oil States and KSR 
indicates, even one prior argument probably has a positive effect on the lawyer’s 
ability to obtain cert.), whether the lawyer is a former Supreme Court clerk, and 
whether the lawyer formerly worked in the Solicitor General’s office.  All of those 
data points will shed light on the question of whether it is particular lawyers who 
are driving the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law, turning relatively mundane 
cases into Supreme Court blockbusters, or whether seasoned Supreme Court 
advocates are simply ending up on cases that are already strong candidates for cert.   
Despite the work that remains to be done, this article’s analysis still 
significantly advances our understanding of the agenda-setting process in Supreme 
Court patent cases.  To recap, its main findings are as follows:  First, the Supreme 
Court is increasingly inclined to grant cert. in patent cases as compared to all types 
of cases and as compared to the Court’s historical practice in patent cases.  Second, 
at the same time the Court has become more inclined to grant cert. in patent cases, 
elite advocates have become more involved in patent litigation at the cert. stage.  
                                               
155 See supra tbl. 3 (reporting a 29.4% grant rate for patent cases in which three amicus briefs 
were filed at the cert. stage, as compared to a 6.6% grant rate in patent cases overall). 
156  See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law By Saying 
Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 767-68 (observing that the Federal Circuit could use Rule 36 to 
detract attention from particular decisions). 
157 See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 3, at 318-19 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit’s divided en 
banc vote in Warner-Jenkinson and the accompanying opinions “signaled the importance of the case 
to the [Supreme] Court” and “also provided a menu of alternative positions”). 
158 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Calendar of the Justices: How 
the Supreme Court’s Timing Affects Its Decisionmaking, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 204 (2004) (finding 
that the Court grants a higher percentage of cert. petitions in October (after the Court disposes of 
the large number of petitions that have accumulated during the summer recess), November, January, 
and June). 
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Third, in patent cases, the Court is far more likely to grant a cert. petition filed by 
an elite advocate as compared to the average petition.  Finally, factors strongly 
correlated with the likelihood of a cert. grant in all types of cases, such as orders 
calling for the views of the Solicitor General and a large number of cert.-stage 
amicus briefs, appear to play an outsized role in patent cases. 
The elite bar’s remarkable success at obtaining cert. in patent cases, coupled 
with the seeming importance of the Solicitor General’s views and the number of 
amicus briefs, suggests that the Court relies heavily on heuristics in deciding 
whether to grant cert. in a patent dispute.159  This is perhaps to be expected given 
that patent law can be complex and unfamiliar to the law clerks who sift through 
cert. petitions, particularly when coupled with the lack of circuit splits.  But the 
reliance on heuristics raises the risk that the patent cases decided by the Supreme 
Court—though substantial in number—will not involve the issues of legal doctrine 
on which Supreme Court input would be most useful.  I noted above the two 
decisions in two years on § 271(f)—a statutory provision implicated in only a 
fraction of patent infringement cases.  Likewise, numerous commentators have 
criticized the Court’s recent decisions on patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 
of the Patent Act, arguing that the Court has improperly imported into that doctrine 
considerations of inventiveness and patent scope that are already addressed by 
§ 102’s novelty requirement, § 103’s nonobviousness requirement, and § 112’s 
disclosure requirements.160  Yet the Court has heard more cases on eligibility in the 
past decade (four)161 than it has on all of those other patentability requirements 
combined (two). 162   Why the fixation on eligibility?  One possibility is that 
eligibility disputes are magnets for amicus briefs:  eligibility cases represent four 
of the nine patent cases with the most cert.-stage amicus briefs filed in my 
dataset.163  
                                               
159 For a more in-depth discussion of the indices, signals, and cues the Court uses to cope with 
its enormous cert.-stage workload, see PERRY, supra note 20, 113-39. 
160 For a summary of those critiques, see John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats 
Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 703 (2016).  For the record, in prior work, I have challenged the notion 
that the Supreme Court’s reinvigoration of the eligibility requirement is a negative development.  
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 655 (2018). 
161 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
162 Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (§ 102); Nautilus, 
Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (§ 112).  The Court’s last § 103 decision 
was in 2007, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), despite numerous intervening 
Federal Circuit decisions that appear to be in tension with Supreme Court case law.  See Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. 330, 347 (2017) (citing examples). 
163 Specifically, seven cert.-stage amicus briefs were filed in Myriad, nine in Bilski, and eleven 
in Alice.  This article’s analysis of the importance of amicus briefs makes it all the more remarkable 
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All that said, the increasing involvement of the elite Supreme Court bar in 
patent litigation is not necessarily a bad thing.  In recent decades, a large amount of 
patent scholarship has criticized the work of the Federal Circuit, contending that 
the court has succumbed to pathologies such as capture and tunnel vision often 
associated with specialized courts.164  Because the lawyers who comprise the elite 
Supreme Court bar are not patent law specialists, they could counteract any 
tendency by the Federal Circuit to favor patentees and to encourage patent 
litigation.165  Moreover, because Supreme Court patent cases often involve elite 
lawyers on both sides,166 the quality of advocacy should be high and enable the 
Court to make well-informed decisions in what can sometimes be a complex and 
arcane area of law.  In the end, because the elite bar’s involvement in patent 
litigation is a relatively recent development, it may be too early to decide whether 
it is to be lamented or praised.167 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s return to the bar of patents is one of the most significant 
events in intellectual property law in the past two decades.  This article has linked 
that development to the activity of a small group of lawyers working at the 
country’s most prestigious law firms.  At present, the elite bar’s dominance of 
Supreme Court litigation shows no sign of abating.168  And so the Supreme Court 
                                               
that the Court denied cert.—without even calling for the views of the Solicitor General—in 
Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016), a case in which 22 cert.-stage 
amicus briefs were filed—the most of any patent case in my dataset by far.  See supra tbl. 3.  
164 See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1097 (2014); Michael 
J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1797 (2011); Nard & Duffy, supra 
note 6, at 1622; Rai, supra note 6, at 1099. 
165 See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 
350, 373 (2014) (discussing the possibility of interest group capture of the Federal Circuit and 
contending that the court is not necessarily “pro-patent,” as critics often suggest, but “pro-patent 
lawyer” because it shapes patent doctrine to encourage companies to actively obtain patents and to 
encourage both plaintiffs and defendants to vigorously litigate infringement disputes). 
166 See supra tbl. 7. 
167 In a companion piece to this article, prepared for a law review symposium on Administering 
Patent Law, I explore in more detail the normative implications of having a small, relatively 
homogeneous group of lawyers play such a large role in shaping patent doctrine.  See Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, Elite Patent Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).  I also present the results of an 
empirical study showing that elite Supreme Court lawyers are increasingly involved in patent cases 
at the Federal Circuit level, too, casting doubt on the conventional wisdom that the practice of patent 
law is limited to specialized lawyers with backgrounds in the hard sciences.  See id.  
168 See Jacqueline Bell, The Firms That Won Big at the Supreme Court, LAW360 (July 1, 2018) 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1057730/the-firms-that-won-big-at-the-supreme-court (noting 
that lawyers from nine different law firms argued three or more Supreme Court cases in the 2017 
Term). 
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has, in all likelihood, not only returned to the bar of patents—it has pulled up a 
chair.   
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APPENDIX A.  PAID CERT. PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES, PATENT VERSUS 
NON-PATENT, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016 (INCLUDING GVR’D CASES) 
 
  
Term Patent Non-Patent Total Patent %	Non-Patent
2002 37 40 77 48.1% 51.9%
2003 33 46 79 41.8% 58.2%
2004 30 44 74 40.5% 59.5%
2005 31 36 67 46.3% 53.7%
2006 36 46 82 43.9% 56.1%
2007 46 39 85 54.1% 45.9%
2008 49 33 82 59.8% 40.2%
2009 27 42 69 39.1% 60.9%
2010 33 34 67 49.3% 50.7%
2011 27 32 59 45.8% 54.2%
2012 39 25 64 60.9% 39.1%
2013 48 33 81 59.3% 40.7%
2014 49 40 89 55.1% 44.9%
2015 67 28 95 70.5% 29.5%
2016 65 33 98 66.3% 33.7%
Total 617 551 1168 52.8% 47.2%
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APPENDIX B.  CERT.-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN ALL SUPREME COURT 




briefs filed Total Denied Granted % Granted
0 1595 1554 41 2.6%
1 93 79 14 15.1%
2 24 17 7 29.2%
3 14 10 4 28.6%
4 10 5 5 50.0%
5 4 2 2 50.0%
6 1 1 0 0.0%
8 1 1 0 0.0%
9 1 0 1 100.0%
0 or 1 1718 1663 55 3.2%
2 to 4 48 32 16 33.3%
5 or more 7 4 3 42.9%
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APPENDIX C.  CERT.-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN ALL SUPREME COURT 




briefs filed Total Denied Granted % Granted
0 1305 1277 28 2.1%
1 87 72 15 17.2%
2 34 29 5 14.7%
3 28 23 5 17.9%
4 7 5 2 28.6%
5 7 5 2 28.6%
6 2 2 0 0.0%
7 3 3 0 0.0%
9 1 0 1 100.0%
10 1 1 0 0.0%
11 1 0 1 100.0%
14 1 0 1 100.0%
0 or 1 1392 1349 43 3.1%
2 to 4 69 57 12 17.4%
5 or more 16 11 5 31.3%
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APPENDIX D.  CERT.-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN ALL SUPREME COURT 
CASES (PAID PETITIONS ONLY), OT2016 
 
Amicus 
briefs filed Total Denied Granted % Granted
0 1290 1262 28 2.2%
1 115 99 16 13.9%
2 54 45 9 16.7%
3 31 28 3 9.7%
4 21 15 6 28.6%
5 7 4 3 42.9%
6 3 3 0 0.0%
7 6 4 2 33.3%
8 4 2 2 50.0%
9 1 1 0 0.0%
10 1 0 1 100.0%
14 1 0 1 100.0%
0 or 1 1405 1361 44 3.1%
2 to 4 106 88 18 17.0%
5 or more 23 14 9 39.1%
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